Prelude To The Demise of Federation:A Brief History of How the Anglophones Marginalized Themselves

From that point onward the West Cameroon struggle took a new disastrous turn. No longer directed toward equalizing the powers of the federated states, the struggle now centered between the two major parties of West Cameroon: the KNDP and the CPNC. For the first time in the short political history of English-speaking Cameroon, party interest took precedence over the interest of the West Cameroon State. To this struggle, which originated in the cleavage between Foncha and Endeley in 1962, can be traced the genesis of the North West-South West Divide. That cleavage not only marred the uneasy coexistence between the two parties, but also destroyed any prospects of reconciliation.

                                                                        By

                                                           Emmanuel Konde

                                                    (First Published on the scncforum on February 19, 2001)

                                                          Introduction

     This essay is part of a larger work; as such, the narrative that follows cannot but be synoptic. It is synoptic because the pressing questions of the day demand illumination of issues obfuscated by some ideologues. Eschewing my essentially Western training, the approach adopted in this essay is nativist historiography—an interpretation of history through the perspective of a native Cameroonian. The methodology employed is traditional historical narrative, assisted by diachronic and synchronic analyses. That is, I examine historical facts relating to the making of the federation and its demise by looking at the events [actors and actions] that influenced and shaped the outcomes in specific time[s] and place[s] as well as how the events unfolded over the brief period, 1961-1966.

     The narrative is divided into five parts. The first is an overview of the background to the making of contemporary Cameroon, while the second and third parts chart the path toward reunification/independence. The fourth part re-examines the political crises that eventually led to the demise of West Cameroon and, the last, rather than draw any firm conclusions reappraises the developments that were to shape the contours of Cameroon politics.

     In presenting these historical facts, I do not claim originality, as this is a work of synthesis. Nevertheless, it is my fervent hope that this unorthodox contribution, small in magnitude as it were, will not quell the ongoing debates but broaden our perspectives and refine the factual content of our discourse. For the events leading to the demise of the Cameroon Federation were not so complex as to defy common sense.

                                              An Overview

     The Republic of Cameroon is a product of European colonial incursions. Colonized by the Germans in 1884, Kamerun was wrested from her erstwhile colonizer by the Allied forces of Britain and France during the First World War. Partitioned between the victorious allies, in 1922 that Anglo-French division was affirmed by, and the territory transformed into, League of Nations Mandates. Semantics aside, the word mandate was actually a euphemism for colony and thus began Cameroon’s second colonization. It is no surprise that the German Teutonic name for the territory, Kamerun, was Anglicized as Cameroons by the British and Gallicized by the French as Cameroun, for their respective zones.

     At the close of the Second World War the League of Nations Mandates in Cameroon were converted to United Nations Trust Territories, with Britain and France as trustees. Weakened by the carnage of total war that the European powers had unleashed on each other and on the rest of the world, Britain and France could no longer maintain their stranglehold over their Cameroon territories. Consequently, under the aegis of the United Nations [an institutions that was created by the European powers and their American ally], the colonial powers determined to reunite Kamerun. To legitimize their decision, the democratic ritual of Plebiscite was employed to project an aura of indigenous participation.

     Prior to German colonization in 1884, the territory now called the Republic of Cameroon was a collection of village chiefdoms and family villages, characterized by Eugene Wonyu as “veritable little nations” and by Edwin Ardener as a “congeries of nations.” It was the Germans who amalgamated them through conquest, imposed an all-encompassing administrative system, and named it Kamerun. Colonization meant subjugation to the inhabitants of, and a loss of independence for, the little nations. The French policies of assimilation and association notwithstanding, until January 1960 all inhabitants of French Cameroun were “subjects” of France by virtue of their social and political subordination. The inhabitants of British Southern Cameroons suffered the same fate until October 1961, when the territory was reunited with the Republic of Cameroon. Because British Southern Cameroons never attained political independence in its own right, one can hardly speak of a Southern Cameroonian people. The status of the inhabitants of British Southern Cameroons changed from “subject” to “citizen” after reunification, at which time they became Cameroonian citizens. It is abject folly for any person to refer to the inhabitants of the former British Southern Cameroons as “Southern Cameroonians,” let alone “Ambazonians.” From an historical perspective such designations are not only misnomers but also fictitious.
     It was the European powers and their international organizations [the League of Nations and the United Nations] that shaped the trajectory of Cameroon’s history. The great plans were made by the European powers and, whenever it was deemed necessary, some Cameroonian people were called upon to rubber stamp decision made far away from home. These salient facts must not be lost to any serious student of history who seeks to attain an approximate understanding of the unification drama between the former British Southern Cameroons and the independent Republic of Cameroun. The key players on both sides of the unification theater understood this and played their proper roles.

                    Toward Federation: From Bamenda, Foumban, to Yaoundé

     Following the result[s] of the February 1961 Plebiscite in British Southern Cameroons, in which 233,571 voters favored reunification with the Republic of Cameroon and 97,741 opted for joining Nigeria, the evolution toward the reunification of former German Kamerun was set in motion.

     Pursuant to the expressed opinion of the majority at the Plebiscite, three successive conferences were held in June, July and August 1961. Accompanied by popular fanfare, jubilation, and great expectations, these meetings paved the way for the inexorable movement toward reunification. The first of these conferences, the Bamenda Conference, met in June 1961. It was attended by the representatives of British Southern Cameroons’ political parties [KNDP, CPNC, and OK], House of Chiefs, Native Authorities, and British colonial representatives J.H. Beeley as Chairman of the Conference, B.G. Smith as Legal Adviser, and J. Dixon as Secretary. The deliberations sought to acquaint the Government of British Southern Cameroons with responsible opinion prior to their final consultation with the Government of the independent Republic of Cameroun. Some of the issues broached at Bamenda in preparation for Foumban included the presidential tenure of office, system of higher education, the judicial system, and official languages.

     Ostensibly well briefed at the Bamenda Conference, a 25-man delegation representing the power structure of British Southern Cameroons, led by John N. Foncha, proceeded to Foumban in July 1961. It is not clear what arrangements were made between the Government of British Southern Cameroons and the Government of the Republic of Cameroun before the Foumban Conference. Confronted by the smaller ten-member delegation of technocrats led by Ahmadou Ahidjo, the ill-prepared delegation from Southern Cameroons was completely flustered, flabbergasted, and then overwhelmed by the overly-preparedness of their counterparts from Yaoundé.

     To discerning minds, this inauspicious beginning may have presaged the end for British Southern Cameroons.

     Some scholars had initially maintained that the draft constitution that the Republic of Cameroun presented the Southern Cameroons delegation at Foumban was composed in French and no member of the Buea delegation had seen a copy beforehand. If that were the case, the Southern Cameroons delegation should have asked for more time to prepare or withdrawn. At any rate, it did not. It is now known that copies of the proposed draft federal constitution had been deposited with Prime Minister J.N. Foncha, who failed to make available said document to the members of his delegation. We are yet to learn why Mr. Foncha did not distribute copies of the draft constitution to members of the Southern Cameroons delegation prior to Foumban.

     Yet, another meeting in August 1961—the Yaoundé Tripartite Conference, followed. Attended by members of the governments of British Southern Cameroons, the Republic of Cameroun, and Britain, the purpose of this meeting was to settle matters relating to national defense and security. Representing the Government of Southern Cameroons were J.N. Foncha [Prime Minister], S.T. Muna [Minister of Finance], and A.N. Jua, Minister of Social Affairs.

                                               From Britain to Ahmadou Ahidjo

      Following the settlement of all relevant issues pertaining to the union of the separated zones of former German Kamerun, the reunification agreement was finally sealed. On September 30, 1961, President Ahidjo flew to Buea and the representatives of the United Nations administering trustee, Britain, constitutionally transferred the sovereignty of British Southern Cameroons to Ahmadou Ahidjo as Head of State. The next day, October 1, British Southern Cameroons was proclaimed independent and reunited with the Republic of Cameroun.

     The transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the President of the Republic of Cameroun [and not the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons] should be quite instructive. It is important that we pause for a moment and reflect soberly upon the symbolism, if not significance, of that solemn handing over ceremony. This seemingly unimportant ritual holds key to the political evolution of Cameroon from the birth of the federation in 1961 to its ultimate demise in 1972. The symbolism of that event in the political history of Cameroon must not be lost to, or ignored by, any person who seeks to understand the movement from reunification to federation to demise of federation. It speaks volumes about the trappings of power as well as the nature of the union that was forged. Only when this event would have been properly analyzed, and I cannot here aspire to do so, then and only then would we begin to approximate a clear understanding of why our Southern Cameroonian politicians have been so silent.

                                           The Politics of Powerlessness?

     Ahidjo began pressing his plan for a Grand National unified party in West Cameroon as early as January 1962, and repeatedly made this call during visits there in May, June, and July of that year. By April 1962 John Ngu Foncha had accepted Ahidjo’s scheme, following an agreement of non-interference between Ahidjo and Foncha. That agreement demarcated the respective spheres of the governing parties in the new federation: The Union Camerounaise (UC) would not interfere in West Cameroon and the KNDP would likewise desist from interfering in East Cameroon.

     At this infancy stage of the new union, the first signs of dissension within the ranks of West Cameroon politicians began to surface. This dissension may be attributed to the relegation of Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, leader of the opposition CPNC Party, to a position of insignificance. Against the traditional practices of the then embryonic democratic system, Foncha took up negotiations with Ahidjo without consulting an important part of the West Cameroon equation—the CPNC. At Foumban, the KNDP reduced the CPNC to non-actor status. One CPNC delegate, Motomby Woleta, had complained that consultations between the KNDP and the CPNC were sporadic at Foumban. At times the KNDP took the CPNC into confidence; at other times they chose not to. The Foumban negotiations were between two parties: KNDP and UC. Two men largely dominated the conference: Foncha and Ahidjo, who spent many hours together in seclusion.

     As a result of the rebuff he suffered at Foumban, Endeley determined to neutralize the growing dominance of Foncha and his KNDP in West Cameroon. Thus, when Foncha gave his approval to Ahidjo’s Grand National unified party, Endeley demurred. He went a step further to best Foncha by expressing his preference for the creation of a single party in the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Endeley wished for his CPNC and Foncha’s KNDP to dissolve and, with all their members, join Ahidjo’s UC.

     From that point onward the West Cameroon struggle took a new disastrous turn. No longer directed toward equalizing the powers of the federated states, the struggle now centered between the two major parties of West Cameroon: the KNDP and the CPNC. For the first time in the short political history of English-speaking Cameroon, party interest took precedence over the interest of the West Cameroon State. To this struggle, which originated in the cleavage between Foncha and Endeley in 1962, can be traced the genesis of the North West-South West Divide. That cleavage not only marred the uneasy coexistence between the two parties, but also destroyed any prospects of reconciliation.

     Meanwhile, a strange twist of events was unraveling in the West Cameroon capital of Buea. I chose to call it the “KNDP debacle” because it exposed the fragility of the yet-unformed democracy that the departing British colonialists had instituted in their former Southern Cameroons territory. More of a democracy of high-sounding speeches than of action, at heart, the politicians of West Cameroon remained little despots garbed in the flowery language of “democratic-speak,” a language that they spoke eloquently but hardly understood.

     Undisciplined and intolerant politicians that they were, the occasion for political infighting came up in 1963, with the important vacancies of Vice President [deputy to Foncha] and Secretary General in the KNDP. The ferocious bloodletting that ensued far exceeded anything imaginable. Because it was expected that Foncha would move to Yaoundé as Vice President of the Federation after the 1965 elections, whoever occupied the post of Vice President of the KNDP would automatically become Prime Minister of West Cameroon. The prospective power vacuum and proximity of power drew blood from the contestants, whose actions in those fateful days would have far-reaching repercussions as well as debilitating consequences for the West Cameroon State.

     Accordingly, the primitive passions that had been held in check by the presence of their British mentors, now gone, flared up to the surface. Two hostile camps immediately emerged within the KNDP. Augustine N. Jua and Nzo Ekhah-Nghaki on one, and Solomon T. Muna and Emmanuel Tabi Egbe on the other, camp vied for the vacant positions of Vice President and Secretary General, respectively.

     Foncha’s indecision at that moment of crisis, when the party needed an astute leader and man of decision, threw the KNDP into a state of uproar and disarray. Coupled with the alleged discrimination of Foncha’s administration, which antagonized many adherents of the KNDP, his support for Muna did not bode well. Muna came with his own baggage. He was a Federation man, well noted for his political opportunism. Jua, by contrast, was believed to be a West Cameroonian through and through. Given his impeccable and appealing credentials, Jua emerged victorious over Muna with a vote of 175 to Muna’s 73 for the position of Vice President, while Ekhah-Nghaky defeated Tabi Egbe by 159 to 95 for Secretary General.

     Clearly beaten, Muna refused to concede defeat, and, persuaded by his KNDP supporters, he argued that it was President Ahidjo who had the constitutional power to appoint the State’s Prime Minister. This was indeed a new development that Mr. Ahidjo might not have thought out for himself. Muna provided it to him, just as Endeley had done the idea of a single party. As time and time again, meeting after meeting, ballot after ballot, Jua won one victory after another, so did Muna reject the outcome of every ballot. From all apparent indications, Muna was undermining the quasi, undeveloped democratic practices of West Cameroon by his recalcitrant attitude. To help bring resolve this shameful episode, a joint West Cameroon-Federal parliamentary delegation intervened. At its May 9, 1965 meeting, Foncha adroitly abandoned Muna and endorsed Jua. The rejected Muna would later accuse Foncha as KNDP’s “number one devil” and Nzo Ekhah-Nghaky as the “number two devil.”

     The schism within the KNDP revealed some terrible cracks in the much-vaunted democracy of West Cameroon, causing considerable headaches and heartaches that required the attention of the political doctor, President Ahidjo. The president immediately flew to Buea and, upon reviewing the opinions of the political leadership of the state, Ahidjo likewise acknowledged Jua as Prime Minister. Only after the leader of the Federal Republic had spoken did Muna reluctantly concede, and Jua move to expel Muna and his supporters: E.T. Egbe, W.N.O Effiom, J.M. Bokwe, M.N. Ndoke, S. Mofor, L.T. Omenjoh, J.K.N. Tataw, B.T. Sakah, and M. Fusi from the KNDP.

     S.T. Muna and his cabal founded their own party, the Cameroon United Congress (CUC), in 1965. The events surrounding this struggle for power within the KNDP, as well as the troubled birth of the CUC, not only gave added momentum to Ahidjo’s call for a Grand National unified party, but also signaled the beginning of the end of West Cameroon and the federation.

                                                  Retrospective

     KNDP’s political rift no doubt produced life-long enmity, destroyed confidence and trusts among West Cameroon’s political actors, tore apart any semblance of unity, and undermined the credibility of both the State and the political stature of its leaders. The disarray that attended the KNDP debacle was in itself telling. From the ashes arose the towering figure of one man, the final arbiter of disputes—Ahmadou Ahidjo. With his presence and reputation looming larger at each encounter with his West Cameroonian counterparts, so too did his political fortunes. From Endeley he received the idea of a single party and from Muna the idea that he had the power to appoint occupants to the hitherto elective office of Prime Minister.

     Barely four years into the federation, the West Cameroonians had destroyed themselves through petty squabbles and infantile bickering. Many are the anecdotal accounts of Ahidjo arbitrating disputes between and among the West Cameroonian men of power. This writer is not gifted in recounting episodes that cannot be verified, confirmed or disconfirmed. Jua’s last minute attempt in 1966 to form a KNDP-CPNC coalition government was designed to stymie the tide toward disintegration. A fine and applaudable political gesture, Jua’s move came a little too late.

    The initiative of movement in the federation had moved to Ahidjo’s camp. Unencumbered by a West Cameroon counterweight, Ahidjo was left to his own devices. What followed was the reign of Ahmadou Ahidjo [President, Head of State and Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chairman, etc., etc.] in Cameroon. The opportunity to inaugurate personal rule in Cameroon was served to Ahidjo in a silver platter, by the West Cameroon politicians.


KNDP stands for Kamerun National Democratic Party; UC: Union Camerounaise; CPNC: Cameroon People's National Congress: OK: One Kamerun

The Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC and its Problems: What must be done to fix these Problems

     Nanje School of Creative Thinking has turned its focus this time around to reveal the findings of its investigations. At issue, is the way the Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC conducts its daily business with its clients.

                                             By Jackson W. Nanje

     Over the years, Cameroonians residing in the United States have always complained about the poor treatment they get from their embassy in Washington DC, which is a place they ought to call home. Rather, it has been a place where hostile treatment has been the hallmark to have necessitated this investigation. Also, it is the opinion of most Cameroonians that the Cameroon Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency, Joseph Foe-Atangana, just like his predecessors, has not been able to adequately address the frustrations of Cameroonians. It is also the conclusion of our investigations that the reason some of these problems have not been solved is partly due to the selection process of our ambassadors (described below) by the President of Republic, who does the selection strictly on tribal grounds rather than on meritorious considerations. The present ambassador may be a good man as some have testified; however, his inability to address the numerous problems that Cameroonians are confronted with tends to give credence to our conclusive investigative report---which hinges around the poor selection process of these ambassadors. These ambassadors lack the necessary fundamentals in conflict resolution to be able to address these problems which have kept stirring at them like a deer in a fog light immediately after Cameroon established diplomatic relations with the United States.  Indeed, because all of our ambassadors, including Foe-Atangana, have never been tested in the field of real diplomacy, and because they were hand-picked without any form of scrutiny by Members of Parliament, they therefore lack the ability to understand the complexities that come with the responsibilities as a Cameroon Ambassador to the United States. This is even more complicated because, if all of them, beginning from Ambassador Paul Pondi to Jerome Mendounga and now to Joseph Foe-Atangana had been previously tested through the ascendency process prior to coming to the United States, they would possess some form of creative imagination in disentangling the web of problems at the embassy that Cameroonians have constantly complained of. All three ambassadors lack sophistry in dealing with the problems; and their inability resonate from the selection process. It is also our understanding that visa requests and passport renewals and issuance are the two sought-after services of most Cameroonian-Americans. Why the embassy cannot accommodate these basic needs, is beyond comprehension.

     Our investigations further reveal that Ambassador Foe-Atangana merits a C-plus in his job approval ratings due to the fact that he has been able to address some of the problems better than his predecessors. Some will even attest to the fact that the ambassador has made it a pledge that anyone who is unable to get good service from any of his embassy staffer should contact him via his direct line with their problems. Indeed, it is the testimony of a few whom the ambassador has intervened on their behalf that, he has in fact, resolved some of their problems at the embassy. But is that what is expected of an ambassador, who is suppose to imbibe in each of his staff the call of duty, to rise to the demands and responsibilities of public service without choosing who, which, and whose problems to solve? This, in no small way calls on the President of the country to revisit the selection process of his ambassadors. He needs to appoint them while the parliament confirms them.

      The issue we are confronted with isn’t whether the ambassador is a good man or whether a few of his staffers who have chosen to ply their career in the public service are good civil servants; we are expecting the embassy servants, under the guidance of the ambassador, whom we expect to possess the necessary skills and credentials, to tackle these problems and also for them to perform beyond the call of duty in the delivery of services to their clients, regardless.

     When we take an ephemeral glance, for instance, at the estimated annual revenue raised by the Embassy officials from visa applications and other services it renders to clients alone, it is unimaginable, unpardonable and unconscionable why a portion of that huge revenue it raises annually cannot be ploughed back into addressing these age-old problems. The embassy can self-finance its activities based on the vast revenue it generates. The embassy processes approximately five hundred (500) visa applications weekly with exceptions to the months of November and December, whereby the weekly numbers double to about a thousand (1000) visa applications.  In a year, the embassy processes approximately twenty-eight thousand (28,000) visas at one hundred and forty-one ($141.00) dollars each. The revenue raised from visa applicants alone is $3,948.000.00 (1,974,000,000FCFA). This is approximately 2billion FCFA raised in the United States alone. And this sum is expected to increase each year because the numbers of Cameroonians who apply to become US Citizens increase yearly and very few Cameroonians retire finally to Cameroon to realize a downward shift in revenue. This is stunning revenue that the embassy (Cameroon government) makes from visa applicants (mostly Cameroonians) compared to the documented (lousy) services that they provide to Cameroonians in return. From this revenue alone, one can clearly discern why the request for dual citizenship, which would erase this vast revenue from the government’s coffers and equally ease the problems of Cameroonians, is a far cry, and at best, a futile effort by some Diaspora groups even as the government fails to see the amount of remittances this same individuals transmit via money transport agencies and what they carry along with them during their annual pilgrimage to Cameroon. However, this is a topic for another day.

     Which are these problems that Cameroonians have been so eager for (the ambassadors) or the government of Cameroon to fix? The problems are the following: (a) poor customer service; (b) high visa fees compared to those of other countries similarly placed; (c) delay in processing passports and the need to decentralize consular services; (d) selection process of ambassadors to the US; (e) poorly constructed website. 

                                              (a)  Poor Customer Service

     “The amount of money Cameroonians pay to process their visas and passports compared to the quality of service they get from their embassy in return, is, indeed, pathetic and pitiful” Anonymous.

     “We can have an irate customer who is very wrong; but good business practice requires that you, the provider of the product or service, not argue with the customer. You appease the customer. Let the customer go home happy even if he or she is wrong. That is the overarching goal.” (SAF, Camnetwork)

     The above statements were made by two trained Customer Service personalities from Cameroon, residing in the United States, who see customer service completely differently from the way the embassy personnel (who are always confrontational and rude), see it. Their statements above are the prototype examples of what is expected of our embassy staffers as opposed to that which we currently endure from them.

      You will be lucky to get a staff of the Cameroon Embassy on the phone with good scruples, to empathize with you and address your problem in any way or form expected of anyone who serves and is being paid by the same tax payers who foot their salaries but whom they despise. The staffs hardly answer the phones. I wonder, to begin with, why there are phone lines at embassy which they hardly answer! And if and when they do answer the phones, you will even regret why you ever stayed on that phone to listen to their unpleasant service to you. The staffs are a product of bad selection process and of a poor or insufficient training given them by the Cameroon government.  In other African Embassies, for instance the Nigerian Embassy, trained customer service personnel address the concerns of every caller with respect and due diligence. They do transfer callers to the appropriate authorities and if one leaves a voice mail, the customer representative will ensure that a response to your request or inquiry is communicated to you somehow. Sometimes they go the extra mile to ask you if you were satisfied with the services you received at their embassy. However, this is not the case with the Cameroon Embassy. The ambassador must address this problem and others because, Cameroonians are very unhappy with the poor services they get from his leadership and management of the embassy, which ought to be a safe-haven for them.

     Why is Mr. Gervais Bindzi, who is in-charge of passport renewal and issuance as well as visa services, doing this heavy-lifting alone at the embassy? Cameroonians believe that because he is overwhelmed with his workload, and has not been given adequate back up cover by the ambassador, is one of the reasons for the unacceptable delays and poor customer service that has been substituted for courteous, pleasant and swift services? In Cameroon, for instance, the department of Special branch of the Police department is charged with the issuance of new passports and visa processing. Why the ambassador took away this service from the Commissioner at the embassy needs further clarifications.

                                               (b)    High visa fees

     In order to justify the high cost of Cameroon’s visa fees, Nanje School of Creative Thinking did a comparative analysis of six countries in Africa, which have embassies in the United States, of the cost of their visas vis-à-vis that of Cameroon. The countries on the survey are South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Equatorial Guinea. It is important to know that if a country like the United States raises the cost of her travel visa it is usually tied not only on budget constraints but also to the interest-benefit (or utility) to be gotten by applicants once they arrive in the United States; but the high cost of visa by the Cameroon government (which ought to encourage migration into the country), defies the interest-benefit logic.

     The chart below shows what other countries in Africa charge for a travel visa. We selected countries in Central Africa, which is in the same zone as Cameroon, and also, from West Africa and South of Africa as well. If one compares the cost-benefit-interest analyses of South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana to those of Cameroon, there is absolutely no justification for the imposition of the high cost of the Cameroon’s visa. Also, in countries like Gabon that charges $141.00 as Cameroon, the visa demands for multiple entries whereas that of Cameroon is only for a three (3) months stay. Ghana, whose visa is for three (3) months stay comparatively to what the Cameroon government charges, her visa cost is only $60.00 compared to the $141.00 of Cameroon. See the chart for more comparative analysis.

S. Africa	Cameroon	Gabon	Nigeria	Ghana	Sierra Leone	Equatorial Guinea
$72.00	$141.00	$141.00	Varies but less than Cameroon	$60.00 &$100.00	£75.00/ £100.00	No fees
Valid for 3months	Valid for 3months	Valid for 1825days	Multiple entry	3months &Multiple	6 months Multiple entry	Visa not required

      Obviously, there should be more explanations which the government of Cameroon may provide to justify the high cost of their travel visa fees to visitors different from those of countries similarly placed than meet the eyes. Whatever explanations the government may give for the high cost of its visa fee eludes the cost-benefit-interest analyses. Therefore, the call for a reduction of the fee or the extension in the entry period (multiple) into the country is absolutely needed. The government cannot postpone this issue anymore. They must be addressed now.

              (c) Delays in Passport Issuance & a need to Decentralize Consular Offices

    

     Presently, the Cameroon embassy, like those of other nations in the United States, is situated in the capital city of Washington DC. It caters for the needs of Cameroonians and non-Cameroonians in United States, Mexico, Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and the United Nations Diplomats. Most African nations have had exponential growth in their population in the United States over the years as a result of migration from their native countries. And as a result of the increase in their population they have expanded their consular services in strategic population belts as well. Cameroon population in the US has experienced similar increase; however, in spite of the growth in population, Cameroonians have relentlessly demanded of their government to expand consular services in states closer to them, to ease the congestion at the embassy and to reduce the delays in services. From ambassador to ambassador, promises have been made but none have been kept by all these ambassadors. In fact, they have taken Cameroonians for fools.

      If one should indeed examine the annual revenue (2billion FCFA) earnings of the embassy, with Cameroonians as the primary source of the revenue, it is apparent that, at least two other consular installations in addition to the embassy in Washington DC could be built in the US, and another in the Virgin Islands. But these demands have fallen on dearth ears. Cameroonians have expressed their displeasures for the lack of action through various cultural groups and other ancillary organizations beginning with Ambassadors Paul Pondi (in the 80’s), to Jerome Mendounga (in the 90’s) and now to Joseph Foe-Atangana, for them to inform the Cameroon government of the need to honor their repeated request, to decentralize consular services within the US.

     The Nigerian government for instance, has its embassy in Washington DC but it also has consular offices in Atlanta, Los Angeles and in New York. The Cameroon operates an embassy in Abuja, Lagos and in Calabar, where Cameroon’s present ambassador to the US, Foe-Atangana came from. Also, the Ivory Coast government has, in addition to their embassy in Washington DC, a consular office in Los Angeles. The list is endless. We are however hopeful that the government will undo its wrongdoings and for a change, “listen” to the people in 2013. 

     Since 2008, the government of Cameroon stopped using the Cameroon passport and in its place, adopted the Central African Regional passport that bears the acronym-CEMAC. Cameroonians with the old passports were given substantial time to change from their Cameroon-issued passports to the CEMAC regional passports. In Cameroon it is easy to change or be issued a new passport once all requirements are fulfilled. However, in the United States, as it is with other Cameroonian embassies abroad, there are some bottlenecks involved that has necessitated this report. The Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC serves the following countries: the vast country of the United States, Mexico, and Jamaica, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and United Nations diplomats. Also, Cameroonians who reside in countries out of the United States must make travel arrangements, usually costly, to come to the United States (which is the only passport renewal/issuance authorized center in the region), in order to get a new passport.

     The reason why those making a new passport must travel to the embassy is because the new passports are required to be biometric, that is, passport applicants must provide their fingerprints to be inscribed on the passports. The government ought to have sub-contracted the fingerprint to local Police departments (and have the materials mailed to that police department at cost to the applicant) wherever the applicant finds himself/herself, to prevent the displacement of the applicant, which comes with huge travel cost. In every country of the world today, the Police departments handle the fingerprinting of any sort; and why the Cameroon government cannot outsource the fingerprinting at cost to her clients, stretches my imagination.

     Another disheartening aspect in this passport snag is the amount of time it takes for applicants to receive their passports once the renewal process has been completed. The passports are not processed at the embassy in Washington DC; they are transported to Cameroon by an embassy staff or a reliable individual who happens to be traveling to Cameroon and they are equally brought back by another reliable source when one is found in Cameroon who is coming back to the United States. Why the embassy has not contracted one of these several courier services like UPS, FEDEX, or DHL, all of which have a base in Cameroon (even at cost to the passport applicant), defies every theory of system of organization. So, applicants who need to make their urgent business trips for instance must wait (for approximately 3 months) until when the embassy can find their so-called reliable source to take and bring back their passports before they may travel. This is indeed, despicable. For the money we pay for services at the embassy, they ought to be expedient with the services they provide to their customers because, such delays, are, indeed, unnecessary.

     In order for the embassy to reduce the wait time necessary to process these passports, and increase the positive feedbacks from her clients, she must contract the services of either UPS or FEDEX or DHL. Once one of these agencies is contracted, it will reduce the uncertainty that goes with the so-called reliable passport handlers.

                   (d) The selection process of ambassadors to serve in the US

      We, at the Nanje School of Creative Thinking understand that to include the critic of the ambassadorial selection process may robe some officials of the government the wrong way; perhaps this may be a start for others to start subjecting some of the government’s erratic policies to some degree of scrutiny. It is the belief of most Cameroonians, as our investigations gathered that, the reason why the services at the embassy have been so compromising is partially due to the fact that the selection process of most of our ambassadors, especially those posted to the United States of America, have been wanting. The fact that none of the ambassadors posted to the United States were tested before their diplomatic assignments to complex diplomatic terrain, where superior diplomatic skills shouldn’t be in short supply, is one of the root causes of the contempt. Take for example in America, before one is thrown in the hot zones of diplomacy, such an individual must have served in lesser challenging countries to areas of challenging diplomacy before been posted to the highly compartmentalized diplomatic zones.

     Alternatively, maybe it is about time that the Cameroon government began reviewing the inadequacies of the School of International Relations (IRIC) that trains these ambassadors. There are Cameroonians who studied in schools outside IRIC and out of Cameroon, who could complement the diplomatic core as they make their passage through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into future ambassadors. This unnecessary over-reliance on IRIC, is a disastrous policy that the government must consider making a paradigm shift. Countries like Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ivory Coast, who are far advanced in diplomacy and democratic values than Cameroon, often tap members of its diplomatic core from universities abroad. Professors of Public administration, history and political sciences make good members of the diplomatic core and our government must start looking into those areas for selection of diplomats. After all, they are teachers of diplomacy.

      For over thirty years that President Paul Biya has been in power, he has appointed two ambassadors to the United States: ambassadors Jerome Mendounga and Joseph Foe-Atangana, without the confirmation of the Cameroon House of Parliament. Mendounga was a product of DR Congo (formerly Zaire) and Foe-Atangana came from a consular office in Calabar, Nigeria. We cannot over-emphasize the inadequacies in the selection process or the experiences these two men had prior to their appointments to the highest diplomatic service center in the world; but nonetheless, the conclusion we came to, is that, the poor services Cameroonians encounter at the embassy may be a direct reflection of the poor selection process. No one but President Paul Biya knows what matrix is used in the selection of our ambassadors. We expect those who have excelled in tested areas like Italy, France, Canada, Britain, Germany, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, to merit the honor to be confirmed in our House of Assembly before they are sent to serve in the United States, the heartbeat of democracy and diplomacy. Ambassadors from those small states, especially those from most African countries, who have not evolved through this natural ascendency process, do not honestly qualify to serve as ambassadors in the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Russia, no matter how hard the regime in Yaoundé tries to doctor or impress upon us with their scanty credentials.

     Also, ambassadors are supposed to be career diplomats who have served in different countries for at least two years, and at most, three years and be transferred immediately after to another country where they are expected to stay same. But this is not the case with ambassadors from Cameroon. Our ambassadors spend on average, ten (10) years or more in posted countries before they are transferred. For instance, in the US, Cameroon as a nation has had just three (3) ambassadors since 1960 (52 years). These ambassadors with unnecessary long tenures see themselves as untouchables and therefore, the peoples’ problems and concerns do not mean anything to them. In fact, these untouchables do not see any urgency in addressing the problems of Cameroonians who contribute billions every year to the national budget. And since these ambassadors are answerable to their master (the President) rather than to the tax payers (the people), the problems shall continue to stir at us.

                                         (e) A Poorly constructed Website

     The gateway into every country is through the airport. And, taxi drivers give the first and last impression to visitors that come into any city. Similarly, a hotel doorman, who welcomes the guests on arrival and departure, gives the first and last impression to all guests. All these hold same in our Cameroon embassy in Washington DC, where the first individual clients meet or talk to on the phone is the receptionist, who does not give Cameroonians a pleasant impression. Again, the story of the receptionist at the embassy is one which will be told some other day. The above indicators tell us all about an establishment. Nowadays, many people use the internet as a tool to do business with any organization and/or establishment. You take the American Embassy in Cameroon for an example, you can go online and schedule a visa appointment and that appointment date shall be honored once you arrive at the embassy.

      In today’s world, computers have practically replaced lots of the work previously done by humans. It has also transformed the world and made tasks very easy to accomplish. Many have seized the opportunities that technology has to offer but the Cameroon embassy is yet to get a handle of technology because some of the duties that computers perform are still being performed by the embassy staff. Quite rudimentary! The Cameroon embassy’s website (www.ambacam.org) is one of the worst in the world. Even the websites of some tribes like the Oroko (www.orokousa.org), Manyu (www.mecca-usa.org) and the Bakossi (www.bacda.org), Bali (www.bca.org),  or my village, Dikome Balue (www.dideco.org), have better websites than that of the embassy. In most websites today, one can practically pay for everything through the internet and place them in a cart. When these menu bars are made available at the embassy website, the embassy will be left with very little to do. Such a website is called an interactive one, whereby the customer pays for all his services like visa application, passport size photographs, fiscal stamps and notary online without going from place to place to get these documents assembled. There is absolutely no reason why the high visa fee required of Cameroonians cannot be paid directly into the embassy’s account from the comfort of our homes like other embassies do.

     The presentation of the website is very unpleasant to its clients. Why the embassy cannot hire the services of its countrymen, who are capable of lifting the image of the country by constructing a state-of-the-art website, troubles my aching heart. And most of us are aware of how much it costs to build a website. Why the government cannot cover some of its frailties by changing the gateway (website) into the country, and with all the revenue the embassy generates from visa and passports, it is, indeed, pitiful.

                                             Conclusion

      In conclusion, we found the need to document these problems (which have existed shortly after Cameroon established diplomatic relations with the US) not because we want to bring the embassy to submission, but because of the need to draw the embassy’s attention to the grey areas where it has failed to bring about effective, meaningful, and transformational changes. Mindful of the criticisms lingering around the embassy, the ambassador may be in the position now, hopefully, to search for alternative solutions to address these problems. We are hopeful that our investigative and critical analysis shall enable the Cameroon government, through its ambassador, to who vested powers is given, to start making transformational changes at the embassy in order to win the trust of Cameroonians. Some of such changes should include: (a) sponsorship of many field trips to enable the embassy personnel to interact with Cameroonians during their annual conventions; (b) have cultural representatives or a goodwill ambassadors as liaison officers to the embassy who shall provide updates to their respective communities; (c) Sponsorship of programs to familiarize the embassy staffers to new approach in governance (d) installation of consular services nearer areas in close proximity to Cameroonians (e) employing Cameroonians within the United States who possess the necessary expertise and better customer service skills to positions at the embassy and in the new consular offices. (f) Employ Cameroonian interns (students of Political sciences, hospitality, Public Administration, Liberal Arts) to intern in various departments at the embassy all year round. All these programs are geared towards establishing good and effective Embassy-Cameroonian community relations so that Cameroonians can pride themselves to call the embassy home, at long last.

     Platitudes aside, whether the government of Cameroon assigns incompetent personnel to the Cameroon embassy in the United States or not, is really not the issue; the issue is, each of these ambassadors ought to have used the powers decreed to them and the enormous resources at their disposal, to transform the place into an institutional paradise. It is the ambassador’s responsibility to bring necessary reforms that would transform and uplift the image of the embassy. Cameroonians are tired to see that ambassadors who are sent here only come to loot rather than transform the place, and later abandon the place worse off than they met it. And the fact that the Biya regime keeps each of these ambassadors here for more than ten (10) years is also an issue of grave concern. In order for the embassy to evolve from the present state of decrepitude the government must start rotating Cameroon ambassadors and diplomatic staff members for at least every two (2) years, and at most, three years. No embassy person is expected to stay in any one embassy installations for as many years as Cameroon keep theirs. The fact that they stay for so long in one country is the root cause of corruption and the “I don’t care attitude” they often demonstrate to clients rather than they need to serve them. 

The creation of a Department of Diaspora Affairs by President Paul Biya: Is this Rumor or Real?

It is just about the right time for the government of Cameroon to consider the need for a "ONE STOP SHOP," to handle Diaspora Affairs.

 

                                       By Sam Esale

 

     Your reaction to this rumor about the creation of a Diaspora Department and the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon is rather interesting. You've spent more time discussing the "politics" underlying such a decision, than intelligently analyzing the economic significance or potential benefit of such a program, to the country and to the rest of the world. Almost all the other contributions to the debate also seem to be far more superficial and even less informative than yours. Instead of a premature conversation about which faction of the Diaspora will lead the procession or about who is best suited to head such a department, the relevant questions we need to be asking are simple; what is the purpose of an Office of Diaspora Affairs? Is it necessary to create an Office for Diaspora Affairs at the level of the Presidency, considering the fact that operations at most of our embassies around the world are clumsy, inefficient or ineffective? Can an overhaul, a reform or transformation of embassy functions serve the same purpose? Can the Cameroonian tax payer afford another layer of costly bureaucracy that could drain public revenue or deplete the nation's finite resources?

     Answers to the above questions and more, could provide better input for decision makers in Yaoundé-Cameroon, than the senseless noise from some members of the Cameroon Diaspora community. Please, let us engage our government and politicians with reason and common sense.

     With as many as 50 government ministers and deputies in Cameroon, it is inconceivable that the government has taken so long to come to terms with the decision to capitalize on the significant political, social and economic impact of the Cameroon Diaspora Community (CDC). Other African nations have seen the benefit of active Diaspora engagement, have been at the forefront at creating Offices, Agencies or Ministries, to directly serve that segment of their population. Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and many others, have developed comprehensive programs including Offices, Agencies and Ministries, to sell their countries, "national pride", human capital and products to their international communities. These programs are designed to lure, attract or partner with the Diaspora for internal economic and social development. Ghana is even going a step beyond luring the Diaspora, to actively looking for and attracting African Americans with entrepreneurial mindset, to settle in the country. Sierra Leone has an Office of Diaspora Affairs and Nigeria has an ongoing program including seminars and conferences geared towards the Diaspora community.

It is just about the right time for the government of Cameroon to consider the need for a "ONE STOP SHOP," to handle Diaspora Affairs.

      The population of Cameroon Diaspora has increased by leaps and bounds over the last two decades, and there is no indication that the trend will slow down anytime soon. For example, unofficial sources reveal the population of Cameroon Diaspora in (a) Canada at 12,000, (b) UK at about 15,000 and (c) USA at about 50,000-70,000. Some sources even put the Cameroon-USA Diaspora population at 100,000. Not all Cameroonians in USA are registered at the Embassy in Washington-DC. When one includes the Diaspora population in France and other parts of the European Union (EU), the Cameroon Diaspora population goes up to about half a million or more. Add the Cameroon Diaspora population across Africa, Asia, including India, Australia and Latin America and the total Cameroon Diaspora population will get to one million or more. That is a very significant population segment that cannot be taken for granted by any development economist, either politically, or economically, or intellectually and/or socially. In terms of national development, that is huge human capital resource, with sufficient financial and economic power to affect meaningful change in Cameroon.

      A significant percentage of Cameroonians living abroad are working, holding good paying jobs or professionals and entrepreneurs. The overall assets owned by Cameroonian Diaspora has been estimated at about a billion US dollars or more. One billion US dollars in asset accumulation alone is huge and significant for a nation whose GDP is approximately 18-20 billion US dollars. That is about 5% of Cameroons GDP.

      As far as remittances are concerned, sources like Western Union and Money Gram or World Bank will reveal huge amounts of transfers by individuals or small businesses to Cameroon on a regular basis and these remittances constitute a major source of revenue for most families in the country. As a matter of fact, some economies like Mexico or Guatemala in Latin America or Kenya and Ghana in Africa, factor remittances in the calculation of their GDP. That may be because such remittances exceed more than 5% of the GDP of some of these countries, and Cameroon may not be an exception.

     The Nation of Cameroon will benefit more by creating a Ministry or Office of Diaspora Affairs. In fact, there is more to be gained by the government of Cameroon in this endeavor than to lose. It is a win-win proposition for all parties involved;

 

1)      Direct Investment by Cameroonians living overseas. This will help subsidize family incomes as always, create employment opportunities in cottage industries and increase the state revenue base through direct and indirect taxation.

 

2)      Transfer of Technology. A brave new world is being formed or forged around our nation and Cameroon does not want to lag in technological advancement. Diaspora has the capability in terms of man power, expertise and investment capital and initiative. Cameroon can very easily become the Bangalore -India or Silicon Valley of Africa. The educated labor force is abundant, especially among the youth, where the unemployment rate is shameful or disgraceful.

3)      Specialized skills and knowledge, e.g. manufacturing industry, business administration, accounting & finance. Hospitality, management, leadership, communication & information technology, sales & marketing, education, health care, agriculture, banking & investment services, politics & governance, community organization & development, etc.

 

     These areas are crucial in development economies and the Diaspora has the capabilities to make a difference in work ethics and professionalism or set up and manage infant industries, thus helping the nation to move from a developing economy status to an emerging economy. Diaspora will offer Cameroon the value of resilience and good work ethics in every sector of the economy, public or private. With abundance of raw materials, Cameroon can become a very vibrant industrial economy, where goods and services are produced on the ground for local consumption and for export trade, to neighboring countries like Central African Republic, Gabon, Chad, Congo or even Nigeria, thereby resulting in the creation of a new middle class. The export industry will boost our balance of trade and increase revenue. Exports of manufactured goods to major markets like US or EU will also increase. For instance, why export timber to China and import furniture from the same country? Why export most of our cocoa and coffee beans when we can also manufacture name brand coffees and chocolate products and sell or market to the rest of the world? Why import chicken from China when we can grow chicken in Cameroon? Why bring in pig parts from Sweden or Norway when we can develop piggeries in our country. The answers lie in the proper packaging and marketing of Cameroon as a "product", and by the prudent partnership and collaboration with the vast amounts of knowledge, skills and ingenuity of the Cameroon Diaspora community.

      The creation of the Office of Diaspora Affairs will not be complete without some significant domestic institutional reforms. Like most government initiatives, this one might end up being another window dressing or cosmetic program, just to placate the international community. Such is bad idea. The gains to be derived from real reforms and meaningful transformation, far outweigh the negative consequences of a meaningless Bureau of Diaspora Affairs with Cabinet Minister Status, at the presidency of the Republic. The creation of an Office of Diaspora Affairs must go hand in hand with major institutional reforms such as; More transparency, more accountability and more responsibility on the part of the government. Reforms must include the following aspects; (a) Tax reforms especially within the Custom & Excise Department,(b) Reduction in excessive bureaucracy in business licensing and paperwork, (c) Flexibility in import/export regulations, while protecting infant industries, (d) Overhaul of business Tax codes, etc. (e) The government must also put the idea of DUAL CITIZENSHIP on the table and the creation of a positive and friendly business & professional environment will include a real fight against (f) CORRUPTION.

      Perception can easily become the reality for potential investors or businesses wishing to do business in Cameroon. Several major Corruption indicators point to Cameroon as a not so friendly environment for business or international investment. This is not only based on the poor level of infrastructure or attitudes of local populations, but also on governance, weakness of institutions, lapses in the area of law enforcement, efficiency, education, leadership. Professionalism as well as endemic corruption and/or unethical behavior by public civil servants and technocrats. The 2012 Transparency International (TI) survey puts Cameroon at # 144 out of about 176 nations in CPI and. latest World Bank stats place Cameroon at # 161 out of 183 countries in governance index. There are more indicators from numerous sources spelling gloom and doom. Such a negative image needs very serious improvements, in order for the government to realize the real benefits of the Office of Diaspora Affairs. Anything short of that will be nothing more than cosmetic work or window dressing and therefore pointless. Surely, we can do better than that.

 

Sam Esale is a Doctoral candidate in Leadership and Management Studies and works as a consultant to businesses around the world especially in Africa. To solicit his service he could be reached at autoauthority.esale@gmail.com

Massa Sam Esale

     Yours is the kind of debate I was expecting from our fellow compatriots. On the contrary, although not strange, they came out with their usual stale epidemic analysis. Let me start by thanking you for taking the time to express your genuine thoughts on this very crucial topic. I might not agree with your Political choices but that is completely beside the point. I remember when the Cameroon Government sent a delegation to contact the Diaspora in 2010/2011 (they had meetings in France, London, USA, South Africa and other West African countries); many Cameroonians who participated in those meetings reiterated the burning issue of 1) Dual Nationality and 2) the creation of a Department of Diaspora Affairs amongst other requests; coupled with improved services at our Diplomatic posts.

     I still cannot fathom why the Cameroon Government does not want to embrace this idea of "Dual Nationality" but like they say in any negotiation..."It is a Give and Take"...You win some, you lose some. If in reality, Biya decides to create a Ministerial Department of Diaspora Affairs, I think we should applaud and continue to press for more. As you so intelligently opined, this Department would be a good start. Other visionary African countries have taken the cue and it is all working for the better of their various countries.

     I had in an informal discussion with the Sierra Leone UN representative here in Washington and she told me, the Sierra Leone Diaspora is simply elated and "performing miracles" back at home.

By and large (politics aside) majority of Cameroonians love their country. It is the "Biyamocracy"...i.e. Government for the well connected, by the well Connected, through the well connected...that is at issue here. Cameroonians are suspicious of anything that has a Government imprint. Nepotism, Fraud, Bribery and Corruption are so deeply entrenched in our psyche, that we have a visceral distrust, even for initiatives that we ourselves orchestrate. The country is rotten to its core. Bring up any suggestions; and the person or persons you are addressing already impute satanophobic jaundiced grandiloquence to your ideas. Go figure.

     Just imagine; I report a story (njoh) that I tag outright as a "Rumor" and almost immediately, without no qualms, nonentities and desperado wannabe "politicians" jump in with their empty rhetoric and insults trying to vilify the messenger of the "Rumor"...not that I care one iota, but I simply feel sorry for our brothers and sisters with such negative mindsets. These same individuals were completely opposed to even meeting with the Government delegation from Yaoundé. These same "habitual Opposants" criticized the memorandum submitted to the "delegation" for onward transmission to the Powers that be in Cameroon. What exactly is it these individuals want? They claim for example (and rightly so) that most Cameroon Embassies worldwide are not performing up to expectations. OK. A "Town Hall" meeting is convened (at the personal expense of the conveners) to channel these grievances in a coherent and decisive manner to the Yaoundé apparatchik. Guess how many of these same "keyboard Opposants" showed up?...Anyways, the few who participated eventually drafted a "Memorandum" on behalf of the "Absentees"...and a few months down the road; it is "Rumored" that Mr. Biya has finally accepted to create an "Office of Diaspora Affairs". You would think these same fellows would even call to say "Thank You". Hell No. Their Modus Operandi? Invectives galore, Suspicion, Insults and what have you. Luckily, these "Katchikoro Desperado Mutoumbanza" Politicians are in the minority and would not dissuade "Action Oriented, Positive Thinkers" like some of us to forge ahead.

     I have seen firsthand what "Diaspora Departments" created by forward leaning African nations like Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Egypt, Rwanda and even newly Independent South Sudan...are doing. Once again, thank you for your thought provoking analysis of the situation.

     If I go only by some of the filth and childish vituperation I read from some of these my keyboard "brothers" who by happen-stance miraculously or by "mistik" find themselves in "Mbenge"...I might simply conclude without the slightest iota of ambiguity, that "Le Cameroun est tres mal parti". I know exactly what they will say next: "Mishe Fon is a CPDM spy". As if I care. Bad luck. Wata Go Leave Stone. Diabetes patient no dey fear injection.

Ya Mblalla

Mishe Fon

 

 

Good Morning and Happy New Year Mr. Mishe and all:

      Even before Prime Minster Yang came to Washington and the "populace" met with him and Dr Diana Acha-Morfaw (equivalent of US Trade Representative), President Biya was alledegedly baffled as to "what does Diaspora want?" He thought he already "gave" the Diaspora Office with a Director. I can only imagine he was informed that it was not working - not too sure. Laughter is my thing with twist. But the Director may have been at the subsequent meeting Mishe Fon is writing about.

     Voting right was given and applied - a quest that Nigeria and Kenya Diaspora groups have mounted appeals to no avail on immediate implementation. Dual citizenship is a rally call among a number of Africa Diaspora groups. Liberia had a two day meeting in December 2012 on it. So I asked....why can't this be tabled at the next African Union (AU) summit? Anyway, I am not elaborating on how and the logical arguments, which dovetail with provisions in the AU Constitutive Act. I have blind copied other nationals grappling with the question.

     Going to something else....Mola Esale, no, a Diaspora Office is technically unsuitable to be under the purview of the embassy; the salient premise is not the same but may be complementary. Embassy is foreign affairs with a different mindset but the tenet of Diaspora places citizens on domestic footing back home.

Best,

MsJoe