Prelude To The Demise of Federation:A Brief History of How the Anglophones Marginalized Themselves

From that point onward the West Cameroon struggle took a new disastrous turn. No longer directed toward equalizing the powers of the federated states, the struggle now centered between the two major parties of West Cameroon: the KNDP and the CPNC. For the first time in the short political history of English-speaking Cameroon, party interest took precedence over the interest of the West Cameroon State. To this struggle, which originated in the cleavage between Foncha and Endeley in 1962, can be traced the genesis of the North West-South West Divide. That cleavage not only marred the uneasy coexistence between the two parties, but also destroyed any prospects of reconciliation.

                                                                        By

                                                           Emmanuel Konde

                                                    (First Published on the scncforum on February 19, 2001)

                                                          Introduction

     This essay is part of a larger work; as such, the narrative that follows cannot but be synoptic. It is synoptic because the pressing questions of the day demand illumination of issues obfuscated by some ideologues. Eschewing my essentially Western training, the approach adopted in this essay is nativist historiography—an interpretation of history through the perspective of a native Cameroonian. The methodology employed is traditional historical narrative, assisted by diachronic and synchronic analyses. That is, I examine historical facts relating to the making of the federation and its demise by looking at the events [actors and actions] that influenced and shaped the outcomes in specific time[s] and place[s] as well as how the events unfolded over the brief period, 1961-1966.

     The narrative is divided into five parts. The first is an overview of the background to the making of contemporary Cameroon, while the second and third parts chart the path toward reunification/independence. The fourth part re-examines the political crises that eventually led to the demise of West Cameroon and, the last, rather than draw any firm conclusions reappraises the developments that were to shape the contours of Cameroon politics.

     In presenting these historical facts, I do not claim originality, as this is a work of synthesis. Nevertheless, it is my fervent hope that this unorthodox contribution, small in magnitude as it were, will not quell the ongoing debates but broaden our perspectives and refine the factual content of our discourse. For the events leading to the demise of the Cameroon Federation were not so complex as to defy common sense.

                                              An Overview

     The Republic of Cameroon is a product of European colonial incursions. Colonized by the Germans in 1884, Kamerun was wrested from her erstwhile colonizer by the Allied forces of Britain and France during the First World War. Partitioned between the victorious allies, in 1922 that Anglo-French division was affirmed by, and the territory transformed into, League of Nations Mandates. Semantics aside, the word mandate was actually a euphemism for colony and thus began Cameroon’s second colonization. It is no surprise that the German Teutonic name for the territory, Kamerun, was Anglicized as Cameroons by the British and Gallicized by the French as Cameroun, for their respective zones.

     At the close of the Second World War the League of Nations Mandates in Cameroon were converted to United Nations Trust Territories, with Britain and France as trustees. Weakened by the carnage of total war that the European powers had unleashed on each other and on the rest of the world, Britain and France could no longer maintain their stranglehold over their Cameroon territories. Consequently, under the aegis of the United Nations [an institutions that was created by the European powers and their American ally], the colonial powers determined to reunite Kamerun. To legitimize their decision, the democratic ritual of Plebiscite was employed to project an aura of indigenous participation.

     Prior to German colonization in 1884, the territory now called the Republic of Cameroon was a collection of village chiefdoms and family villages, characterized by Eugene Wonyu as “veritable little nations” and by Edwin Ardener as a “congeries of nations.” It was the Germans who amalgamated them through conquest, imposed an all-encompassing administrative system, and named it Kamerun. Colonization meant subjugation to the inhabitants of, and a loss of independence for, the little nations. The French policies of assimilation and association notwithstanding, until January 1960 all inhabitants of French Cameroun were “subjects” of France by virtue of their social and political subordination. The inhabitants of British Southern Cameroons suffered the same fate until October 1961, when the territory was reunited with the Republic of Cameroon. Because British Southern Cameroons never attained political independence in its own right, one can hardly speak of a Southern Cameroonian people. The status of the inhabitants of British Southern Cameroons changed from “subject” to “citizen” after reunification, at which time they became Cameroonian citizens. It is abject folly for any person to refer to the inhabitants of the former British Southern Cameroons as “Southern Cameroonians,” let alone “Ambazonians.” From an historical perspective such designations are not only misnomers but also fictitious.
     It was the European powers and their international organizations [the League of Nations and the United Nations] that shaped the trajectory of Cameroon’s history. The great plans were made by the European powers and, whenever it was deemed necessary, some Cameroonian people were called upon to rubber stamp decision made far away from home. These salient facts must not be lost to any serious student of history who seeks to attain an approximate understanding of the unification drama between the former British Southern Cameroons and the independent Republic of Cameroun. The key players on both sides of the unification theater understood this and played their proper roles.

                    Toward Federation: From Bamenda, Foumban, to Yaoundé

     Following the result[s] of the February 1961 Plebiscite in British Southern Cameroons, in which 233,571 voters favored reunification with the Republic of Cameroon and 97,741 opted for joining Nigeria, the evolution toward the reunification of former German Kamerun was set in motion.

     Pursuant to the expressed opinion of the majority at the Plebiscite, three successive conferences were held in June, July and August 1961. Accompanied by popular fanfare, jubilation, and great expectations, these meetings paved the way for the inexorable movement toward reunification. The first of these conferences, the Bamenda Conference, met in June 1961. It was attended by the representatives of British Southern Cameroons’ political parties [KNDP, CPNC, and OK], House of Chiefs, Native Authorities, and British colonial representatives J.H. Beeley as Chairman of the Conference, B.G. Smith as Legal Adviser, and J. Dixon as Secretary. The deliberations sought to acquaint the Government of British Southern Cameroons with responsible opinion prior to their final consultation with the Government of the independent Republic of Cameroun. Some of the issues broached at Bamenda in preparation for Foumban included the presidential tenure of office, system of higher education, the judicial system, and official languages.

     Ostensibly well briefed at the Bamenda Conference, a 25-man delegation representing the power structure of British Southern Cameroons, led by John N. Foncha, proceeded to Foumban in July 1961. It is not clear what arrangements were made between the Government of British Southern Cameroons and the Government of the Republic of Cameroun before the Foumban Conference. Confronted by the smaller ten-member delegation of technocrats led by Ahmadou Ahidjo, the ill-prepared delegation from Southern Cameroons was completely flustered, flabbergasted, and then overwhelmed by the overly-preparedness of their counterparts from Yaoundé.

     To discerning minds, this inauspicious beginning may have presaged the end for British Southern Cameroons.

     Some scholars had initially maintained that the draft constitution that the Republic of Cameroun presented the Southern Cameroons delegation at Foumban was composed in French and no member of the Buea delegation had seen a copy beforehand. If that were the case, the Southern Cameroons delegation should have asked for more time to prepare or withdrawn. At any rate, it did not. It is now known that copies of the proposed draft federal constitution had been deposited with Prime Minister J.N. Foncha, who failed to make available said document to the members of his delegation. We are yet to learn why Mr. Foncha did not distribute copies of the draft constitution to members of the Southern Cameroons delegation prior to Foumban.

     Yet, another meeting in August 1961—the Yaoundé Tripartite Conference, followed. Attended by members of the governments of British Southern Cameroons, the Republic of Cameroun, and Britain, the purpose of this meeting was to settle matters relating to national defense and security. Representing the Government of Southern Cameroons were J.N. Foncha [Prime Minister], S.T. Muna [Minister of Finance], and A.N. Jua, Minister of Social Affairs.

                                               From Britain to Ahmadou Ahidjo

      Following the settlement of all relevant issues pertaining to the union of the separated zones of former German Kamerun, the reunification agreement was finally sealed. On September 30, 1961, President Ahidjo flew to Buea and the representatives of the United Nations administering trustee, Britain, constitutionally transferred the sovereignty of British Southern Cameroons to Ahmadou Ahidjo as Head of State. The next day, October 1, British Southern Cameroons was proclaimed independent and reunited with the Republic of Cameroun.

     The transfer of sovereignty from Britain to the President of the Republic of Cameroun [and not the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons] should be quite instructive. It is important that we pause for a moment and reflect soberly upon the symbolism, if not significance, of that solemn handing over ceremony. This seemingly unimportant ritual holds key to the political evolution of Cameroon from the birth of the federation in 1961 to its ultimate demise in 1972. The symbolism of that event in the political history of Cameroon must not be lost to, or ignored by, any person who seeks to understand the movement from reunification to federation to demise of federation. It speaks volumes about the trappings of power as well as the nature of the union that was forged. Only when this event would have been properly analyzed, and I cannot here aspire to do so, then and only then would we begin to approximate a clear understanding of why our Southern Cameroonian politicians have been so silent.

                                           The Politics of Powerlessness?

     Ahidjo began pressing his plan for a Grand National unified party in West Cameroon as early as January 1962, and repeatedly made this call during visits there in May, June, and July of that year. By April 1962 John Ngu Foncha had accepted Ahidjo’s scheme, following an agreement of non-interference between Ahidjo and Foncha. That agreement demarcated the respective spheres of the governing parties in the new federation: The Union Camerounaise (UC) would not interfere in West Cameroon and the KNDP would likewise desist from interfering in East Cameroon.

     At this infancy stage of the new union, the first signs of dissension within the ranks of West Cameroon politicians began to surface. This dissension may be attributed to the relegation of Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, leader of the opposition CPNC Party, to a position of insignificance. Against the traditional practices of the then embryonic democratic system, Foncha took up negotiations with Ahidjo without consulting an important part of the West Cameroon equation—the CPNC. At Foumban, the KNDP reduced the CPNC to non-actor status. One CPNC delegate, Motomby Woleta, had complained that consultations between the KNDP and the CPNC were sporadic at Foumban. At times the KNDP took the CPNC into confidence; at other times they chose not to. The Foumban negotiations were between two parties: KNDP and UC. Two men largely dominated the conference: Foncha and Ahidjo, who spent many hours together in seclusion.

     As a result of the rebuff he suffered at Foumban, Endeley determined to neutralize the growing dominance of Foncha and his KNDP in West Cameroon. Thus, when Foncha gave his approval to Ahidjo’s Grand National unified party, Endeley demurred. He went a step further to best Foncha by expressing his preference for the creation of a single party in the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Endeley wished for his CPNC and Foncha’s KNDP to dissolve and, with all their members, join Ahidjo’s UC.

     From that point onward the West Cameroon struggle took a new disastrous turn. No longer directed toward equalizing the powers of the federated states, the struggle now centered between the two major parties of West Cameroon: the KNDP and the CPNC. For the first time in the short political history of English-speaking Cameroon, party interest took precedence over the interest of the West Cameroon State. To this struggle, which originated in the cleavage between Foncha and Endeley in 1962, can be traced the genesis of the North West-South West Divide. That cleavage not only marred the uneasy coexistence between the two parties, but also destroyed any prospects of reconciliation.

     Meanwhile, a strange twist of events was unraveling in the West Cameroon capital of Buea. I chose to call it the “KNDP debacle” because it exposed the fragility of the yet-unformed democracy that the departing British colonialists had instituted in their former Southern Cameroons territory. More of a democracy of high-sounding speeches than of action, at heart, the politicians of West Cameroon remained little despots garbed in the flowery language of “democratic-speak,” a language that they spoke eloquently but hardly understood.

     Undisciplined and intolerant politicians that they were, the occasion for political infighting came up in 1963, with the important vacancies of Vice President [deputy to Foncha] and Secretary General in the KNDP. The ferocious bloodletting that ensued far exceeded anything imaginable. Because it was expected that Foncha would move to Yaoundé as Vice President of the Federation after the 1965 elections, whoever occupied the post of Vice President of the KNDP would automatically become Prime Minister of West Cameroon. The prospective power vacuum and proximity of power drew blood from the contestants, whose actions in those fateful days would have far-reaching repercussions as well as debilitating consequences for the West Cameroon State.

     Accordingly, the primitive passions that had been held in check by the presence of their British mentors, now gone, flared up to the surface. Two hostile camps immediately emerged within the KNDP. Augustine N. Jua and Nzo Ekhah-Nghaki on one, and Solomon T. Muna and Emmanuel Tabi Egbe on the other, camp vied for the vacant positions of Vice President and Secretary General, respectively.

     Foncha’s indecision at that moment of crisis, when the party needed an astute leader and man of decision, threw the KNDP into a state of uproar and disarray. Coupled with the alleged discrimination of Foncha’s administration, which antagonized many adherents of the KNDP, his support for Muna did not bode well. Muna came with his own baggage. He was a Federation man, well noted for his political opportunism. Jua, by contrast, was believed to be a West Cameroonian through and through. Given his impeccable and appealing credentials, Jua emerged victorious over Muna with a vote of 175 to Muna’s 73 for the position of Vice President, while Ekhah-Nghaky defeated Tabi Egbe by 159 to 95 for Secretary General.

     Clearly beaten, Muna refused to concede defeat, and, persuaded by his KNDP supporters, he argued that it was President Ahidjo who had the constitutional power to appoint the State’s Prime Minister. This was indeed a new development that Mr. Ahidjo might not have thought out for himself. Muna provided it to him, just as Endeley had done the idea of a single party. As time and time again, meeting after meeting, ballot after ballot, Jua won one victory after another, so did Muna reject the outcome of every ballot. From all apparent indications, Muna was undermining the quasi, undeveloped democratic practices of West Cameroon by his recalcitrant attitude. To help bring resolve this shameful episode, a joint West Cameroon-Federal parliamentary delegation intervened. At its May 9, 1965 meeting, Foncha adroitly abandoned Muna and endorsed Jua. The rejected Muna would later accuse Foncha as KNDP’s “number one devil” and Nzo Ekhah-Nghaky as the “number two devil.”

     The schism within the KNDP revealed some terrible cracks in the much-vaunted democracy of West Cameroon, causing considerable headaches and heartaches that required the attention of the political doctor, President Ahidjo. The president immediately flew to Buea and, upon reviewing the opinions of the political leadership of the state, Ahidjo likewise acknowledged Jua as Prime Minister. Only after the leader of the Federal Republic had spoken did Muna reluctantly concede, and Jua move to expel Muna and his supporters: E.T. Egbe, W.N.O Effiom, J.M. Bokwe, M.N. Ndoke, S. Mofor, L.T. Omenjoh, J.K.N. Tataw, B.T. Sakah, and M. Fusi from the KNDP.

     S.T. Muna and his cabal founded their own party, the Cameroon United Congress (CUC), in 1965. The events surrounding this struggle for power within the KNDP, as well as the troubled birth of the CUC, not only gave added momentum to Ahidjo’s call for a Grand National unified party, but also signaled the beginning of the end of West Cameroon and the federation.

                                                  Retrospective

     KNDP’s political rift no doubt produced life-long enmity, destroyed confidence and trusts among West Cameroon’s political actors, tore apart any semblance of unity, and undermined the credibility of both the State and the political stature of its leaders. The disarray that attended the KNDP debacle was in itself telling. From the ashes arose the towering figure of one man, the final arbiter of disputes—Ahmadou Ahidjo. With his presence and reputation looming larger at each encounter with his West Cameroonian counterparts, so too did his political fortunes. From Endeley he received the idea of a single party and from Muna the idea that he had the power to appoint occupants to the hitherto elective office of Prime Minister.

     Barely four years into the federation, the West Cameroonians had destroyed themselves through petty squabbles and infantile bickering. Many are the anecdotal accounts of Ahidjo arbitrating disputes between and among the West Cameroonian men of power. This writer is not gifted in recounting episodes that cannot be verified, confirmed or disconfirmed. Jua’s last minute attempt in 1966 to form a KNDP-CPNC coalition government was designed to stymie the tide toward disintegration. A fine and applaudable political gesture, Jua’s move came a little too late.

    The initiative of movement in the federation had moved to Ahidjo’s camp. Unencumbered by a West Cameroon counterweight, Ahidjo was left to his own devices. What followed was the reign of Ahmadou Ahidjo [President, Head of State and Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chairman, etc., etc.] in Cameroon. The opportunity to inaugurate personal rule in Cameroon was served to Ahidjo in a silver platter, by the West Cameroon politicians.


KNDP stands for Kamerun National Democratic Party; UC: Union Camerounaise; CPNC: Cameroon People's National Congress: OK: One Kamerun