May 1: Reflections on Labor Day

Labor Day was an auspicious moment to reflect on the inhuman and dispiriting conditions of Cameroonian workers, enslaved in the shackles of a rudderless political machinery that sacrifices their welfare on the altar of selfish parochial interests.

By Ekinneh Agbaw-Ebai*

     May 1 was Labor Day and like their counterparts the world over, Cameroonians who labor, in both the public and private sectors spent the day on parade; in commemoration of their plight. In practical terms, the Cameroonian worker is a living testimony of the disconnect between the ruling elite and the masses. Since the advent of the New Deal government, Cameroonian workers have been in the shackles of a rudderless political machinery, which sacrifices their welfare on the altar of selfish parochial interests. Instead of propagating empty slogans about “greater achievements,” government should focus on tangible transformation through policies and concrete capital investment in the lives of workers.

     The inability of the ruling elite to fashion out sustainable policies for human development has plunged the working masses into abysmal poverty. With the grinding poverty and apathy towards youth employment, the nation has been bedeviled by pervasive insecurity. All this is exacerbated by a systemic corruption that has crippled the country. Spurious claims of growth, unreliable statistics on looming prosperity, mendacious forecast of development, imprudent management of resources, unrealistic and non-feasible white elephant projects and unimaginable corruption have made Paul Biya’s much-hyped transformation to an emerging economy by 2035 a mirage.

     Labor Day was thus an auspicious moment to reflect on the inhuman and dispiriting conditions in which Cameroonian workers operate. Beside the decrepit infrastructure, moribund institutions and harrowing bureaucratic obstacles in the public sector, in many private sector companies, there is a sustained slide into modern slavery as young ladies are sexually exploited, objectified and commoditized because they are desperate for employment. Cameroon ranks 150 out of 187 countries in the 2013 UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), which provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income.

     As Cameroonian laborers observe the yearly ritual of Labor Day, they must reflect on their plight and recommit to the fight for economic security, better life and defence of human dignity. For the good of the hardworking people of this country, labor unions and activists may wish to stress the importance of Labor Day by engaging government on the plight of the people. They should use the sanctity of Labor Day to familiarize Cameroonians with the fact that obnoxious policies favorable only to entrenched interests have made a living hell out of Cameroon for workers.

     Labor Day is also a period to think deeply about the unemployed. In a country where 48 % of the population lives below the poverty line; with youth unemployment at 13%, Cameroon totters on the brink of a precipice if this national crisis is not addressed. Unemployment has scaled alarming levels to compel the declaration of a national emergency. There is certainly an urgent need to emphasize job creation in private and public sectors. As typical of a government caught between confusion and deception, there is no strategic agenda for job creation. This is a sad commentary on the vision or lack thereof on the part of Cameroonian leaders. And to illustrate the visionlessness embedded in our governance, how much of the national budget is for job creation? To successfully tackle unemployment, all government budgets must include specific targets of job creation in each financial year.

     For the vulnerable senior citizens, who have toiled and are expectant of a rewarding life as pensioners, a beleaguered pension system has not only been a failure, a grand theft of the pensions by government officials has been one of the most spectacular tragedies of the nation. The harrowing experiences of pensioners over the collection of their paltry gratuity, as well as alarming stories of fraud perpetrated in the national social insurance fund (CNPS) are testament to a nation fast losing its soul.

     Add all these to unscrupulous expatriates who exploit the nation’s corrupt system to break labor laws and ethical norms. While foreign investors are certainly welcome, it often seems that many expatriates deliberately set out to operate outside laws, regulations and even morality. These companies have appalling labor standards. Wages are extremely low, job security non-existent and the widely-held belief is that foreign companies treat workers shabbily, confident in their ability to operate above the law. This negatively impacts the economy; from low productivity of workers trapped in demoralizing jobs to the millions of francs worth of consumption power the economy loses when workers are underpaid.

     Foreign companies routinely hire their nationals to occupy positions that thousands of unemployed Cameroonians are perfectly qualified to do. Some of the companies don’t even bother at times to obtain the required work permit; their nationals just jump on the plane to start working in Cameroon. A not so discreet discrimination operates in these companies when managerial positions are exclusively allotted to nationals from their home countries who are promoted over and above better qualified and more experienced Cameroonians. And it must be said that foreign companies who specialize in unethical conduct are doing so only because Cameroonian politicians and bureaucrats would rather profit from that system than conscientiously hold them accountable.

     As condemnable as this is, it reflects the deepening crisis and contradictions of the Cameroonian state, especially given its grossly apparent declining capacity, if not total failure, to measure up to its responsibilities in all ramifications. When the level of state robbery by public officials and the absurdity of their extravagant life style vis-à-vis the squalor of the majority are considered, the despondency of workers encompasses criminality and soullessness. This should tug at the heart-strings of members of the occupation brigade otherwise called leaders. In Nigeria and Ghana, Labor Day celebrations were presided at, by President Goodluck Jonathan and John Mahama respectively - a powerful symbol of solidarity that the Commander-in-Chief is also the “Worker-in-Chief” doing the job given him by the people; who elected (hired) him. That Biya has never presided over Labor Day celebrations in over 30 years in office, is a mark of the contempt with which the President holds the Cameroonian worker!

     It is for this and other reasons, that Labor Day should neither be a day for parades with no message of social relevance, nor one day in the year when government officials, oblivious of the plight of the masses, sardonically claim solidarity with workers. To address workers’ plight, government must go back to basics: provide a conducive environment for citizens to expend their energy, time and skills through work for their own self-actualization and optimal development of society. The need for the President to show leadership in providing the enabling environment necessary for integral development of society is more than just an urgent national imperative.

*Ekinneh Agbaw-Ebai is a public intellectual and graduate of Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government where he was Managing Editor of the Harvard Journal of African-American Public Policy. A former Research Analyst for Central Africa with Freedom House, he is a consultant and lives in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. Talk back at ekinneh@yahoo.com.

Who Owns Kumba Chieftaincy Stool?

This information "unveiled" the Muketes as the "indisputable owners of the Bafaw paramount chieftaincy stool". Any lingering doubts that this was so was dispelled by "a press statement" issued "a few years ago" by the "Kumba kingmakers" comprising "the ten founding Bafaw families" who presumably also formed the Kumba Traditional Council. Speaking for them, the chairman of the Council Kwo Eseme declared that the Mukete dynasty is the "sole and legitimate entity of the institution”. He added: "Kumba has no chieftaincy dispute. H.R.H. Nfor (Nfon) V.E. Mukete is the sole ruler of the Bafaws and going by Bafaw tradition his dynasty continues". This claim is further bolstered by Ekale John Mpenye, the "representative of the family head of Baskibi (Bashibi) the founding family of Kumba". He Reiterates: "the legitimate Kumba Chieftaincy stool lies with the Muketes". However indirectly, therefore, both Kwo Eseme and Mpenye ultimately appeal to tradition.

                                                  By Prof. Lovett Z. Elango*

     Tamfu Harrison Bawe begins his article, "Colonial archives unveil rightful owners of Bafaw paramount chieftaincy stool (Guardian Post Monday 7 - 13 December 2009 p. 5) with the statement that the "decades-old" controversy "about the rightful owners of the Bafaw paramount chieftaincy stool" has been "put to rest once and forever, thanks to a colonial report put together by the credible National Achieve of the University of Ibandan..."

     The triumphant finality of this statement is no doubt intended to end all discussion about the chieftaincy of Kumba that divides the Bafo people even today. Bawe's statement is based on information recorded in the Bafo Assessment Report 1923-1924, a colonial document written by R.W.M. Dundas, the District Officer (D.O.) of Kumba, following investigations conducted in all Bafo villages. Despite Bawe's conclusion, however, his piece raises more questions than it answers.

     The report, we are told, "was not just simply written"; in other words, it was the result of systematic investigations. It was "credible" and "authentic" precisely because it was based on information gathered by Dundas and his African staff with the "active collaboration" of prominent Bafo village notables. This information "unveiled" the Muketes as the "indisputable owners of the Bafaw paramount chieftaincy stool". Any lingering doubts that this was so was dispelled by "a press statement" issued "a few years ago" by the "Kumba kingmakers" comprising "the ten founding Bafaw families" who presumably also formed the Kumba Traditional Council. Speaking for them, the chairman of the Council Kwo Eseme declared that the Mukete dynasty is the "sole and legitimate entity of the institution”. He added: "Kumba has no chieftaincy dispute. H.R.H. Nfor (Nfon) V.E. Mukete is the sole ruler of the Bafaws and going by Bafaw tradition his dynasty continues". This claim is further bolstered by Ekale John Mpenye, the "representative of the family head of Baskibi (Bashibi) the founding family of Kumba". He Reiterates: "the legitimate Kumba Chieftaincy stool lies with the Muketes". However indirectly, therefore, both Kwo Eseme and Mpenye ultimately appeal to tradition. They both seem to believe that to make their case credible all that is needed is to invent fictitious "kingmakers" and make passionate declarations which sound like oaths of fealty.

     Still, their statements are impressive testimonials which would normally be incontestable but which, in the present context, cannot be unchallenged because they seem to be mere afterthought leading one to ask why, for example, they do not mention Ebakudibo even though Dundas himself used Ebakudibo's name and testimony to discredit Mulango in order to secure his removal and ensure Mukete's appointment to replace him. Is it because they recognize the break in the continuity of the chieftaincy represented by Ebakudibo but do not grasp its implications for the institution created by administrative fiat by British colonial authorities? Is it because it is too embarrassing a detail to be mentioned because it does not corroborate their claims of traditional legitimacy?

     Thus, as impressive as the testimonials may seem at first glance, they cannot be a substitute for answers to these hard questions, and the failure or refusal to confront and answer them does not inspire confidence. The testimonials are therefore rather misplaced and unconvincing, as will become clear subsequently.

     Suffice it to say here, however, that both Kwo Eseme and Mpenye know or should know, since they appeal variously to tradition, that the institution of paramount chief is alien to Bafo experience. Bafo society is decentralization in the sense that each village is autonomous and has its own chief and government. The paramount chieftaincy of Bafo was invented and imposed on them by British colonial authorities for their own convenience and to achieve imperial goals. The first paramount chief so-called was Mulango and he nominally ruled not only the Bafo but also their non-Bafo neighbours like the Barombi, Ekumbe and the reluctant Balung. Dundas himself acknowledged that traditionally the Bafo did not have a single paramount ruler. The only institution that united them was the Difon or Lifon society. This explains why he was "surprised" when Abel Mukete's appointment in 1929 was "welcomed with joy in each village". It must have been a pleasant surprise because it suited the British Policy of "reforming" Bafo society. He attributed this to Mukete's "sense of direction" which proved "his determination to lead the Bafaw tribe positively..." he was particularly pleased to discover from his investigations that because his father was "the last son of the last Akwodifon or Difon priest of the Bajorikwe (Bajuki) family", Mukete had "some" hereditary claim to the position to which Government has appointed him.

     The latter statement is clearly misleading: being a member or even a priest of Difon did not necessarily confer the right to chieftaincy and one is led to ask whether Akwodifon was also chief of his own village, not to mention the chief of Kumba, the position to which the Government has now appointed his grandson Abel Mukete. Moreover, Dundas also points out that the appointment was made "owing to the strong representations by the late Senior Resident, Mr. Arnett". These strong representations were no doubt influenced by the reports and recommendations of Dundas and other administrators of Kumba who portrayed Mukete as "progressive" and compared him favourably with the "savvy" but "corrupt" Mulango.

     In any case, the creation of the paramount chieftaincy was an innovation by which the British sought to reorganise Bafo society and British authorities were aware that the success of the innovation depended ultimately on their support of men like Abel Mukete and not on the traditional legitimacy of the appointees. In other words, these men, having been appointed by Government, served first and foremost at the pleasure of the government and only in the second place at the pleasure of their people.

     It is not irrelevant to point out in this connection that Mulango has been appointed District Head partly, if not largely, as a reward for his service in gathering intelligence for the British when they entered Buea during the Anglo-French campaign in Cameroon in the First World War. On the other hand, Mukete's appointment was due to his "progressiveness" and to his Difon ancestry however remote it may have been. Such appointments reveal the role which non-traditional criteria were beginning to play in the European choice of the men who became the indigenous agents of colonial rule. They also show that in any conflict between the competing claims of imperial policy and indigenous rights and interests, the latter could be swept aside presumably to promote and achieve "good government" and, no doubt, the superior interests of "civilisation" .

     In the case of Mukete, Dundas gave the impression that the appointment was universally welcomed. But he was being disingenuous. In fact, opposition to the appointment and to Mukete's rule began almost immediately. It was sustained and reflected in the petitions which some Bafo notables wrote to the D.O. Kumba against him. So frequent did these petitions become that Mukete himself was forced to react. Things came to a boil in 1936, roughly seven years after his accession, when he wrote to the D.O. Kumba, A.G. Williams, reminding him that "between 1927-1936" he, Williams, had received "something approaching half a dozen petitions from my people disclaiming me as the rightful man to be the chief of Kumba". He continued: "if intruders rise now to say that I am not the rightful man there may be something sensible about their claims. In any case, he wanted the government to do one of two things to resolve the matter. In his own words, "either these scandalous men are satisfied or they must be seriously reprimanded so that tranquility may reign".

     But the "scandalous men" could not be easily appeased. For one thing, they were allegedly being incited by the "savvy" and aggrieved Mulango who had just been permitted to return to Kumba from Buea where he had been "deported" for disciplinary reasons. More important, however, the main cause of their grievance - the crux of their petition - was not addressed. They wanted to know "where did Abel Mukete bring this chief position? When he is not the son of Mediki of the son of Ebaku Dibo, and he is not in our family..." Essentially, they were questioning the legitimacy of Mukete's position in tradition and so long as that question was not answered, the petitioners who were allegedly fomenting the unrest in the town could not be appeased and tranquility could not "reign". If anyone could be faulted for this state of affairs, it was the government which did not and could not address the fundamental issue raised by the petitioners because it had committed itself to a policy of so-called reform which was not easy to reconcile with the demands of people who, from the British point of view, seemed like conservative, backward-looking traditionalists. Rather, the government simply ignored the niceties of tradition and rode roughshod over their concerns.

     Not surprisingly, after reviewing the petition, the D.O. forwarded it to the Resident, Buea, with the recommendation that the leading petitioners, all Bafo notables of Bapeban lineage, be exiled. When the Resident referred the matter of the Chief Commissioner for Southern Provinces, Enugu, the chief commissioner’s response, contained in a lengthy minute dated 7 January 1937 and transmitted by the secretary for the southern provinces, was blunt.

     It was further proof that the position of paramount chief was indeed a government fabrication and that British Authorities were aware of it. "The appointment of Abel Mukete as District Head of the Bafaws", the commissioner wrote "was as Melango's". He added that Mukete had retained his position when others have fallen because he used his position wisely. As long as he continued to so, the commissioner emphasised, "he will receive the support of Government" The commissioner then concluded: "I appreciate Mukete's difficulties, which are by no means peculiar to him, and if he is unable to shoulder his responsibilities he should resign"

     The commissioner’s minute warrants some extended comment. To begin with, it recognized the "artificiality" of the District Headship or paramount chieftaincy because not only was it rooted in tradition; it also owed its existence and survival to government support alone.

     There was no reference to tradition or the traditional chieftaincy held by Ebakudibo before Mulango and after him, Mukete. This was largely due to the coalition of the two institutions, one traditional, the other colonial, which began with Mulango's appointment and continued with Mukete. The conflation was worse compounded by the facts that the terms District Head and Paramount Chief were made virtually synonymous and the District Head of Kumba and all Bafaw was at least also nominal ruler of the Barombi, Ekumbe and the reluctant Balung-an unprecedented situation. It created a new institution without necessarily abolishing the old one. Indeed, the two became so entangled that it is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate the one from the other at first glance.

     Only those therefore who have some knowledge of the historical realities and traditional values involved can infer from any statement about the Bafo chieftaincy, which one of the institutions is being referred to. The resulting confusion, then now, is at the heart of the present controversy. Finally, the Commissioner’s comments make it clear that other appointees like Mukete, presumably also "artificial" chiefs like him, had similar problems. There were several examples in Kumba, the Cameroons and elsewhere to confirm this and they showed how widespread was the tampering with and manipulation of the institution of chieftaincy by colonial authorities.

     The problem with such manipulations was that some of the appointed chiefs, assured government support, exploited or tried to exploit it to advance personal agendas. It would certainly have pleased Mukete if government exiled the petitioners and he would just as certainly not have hesitated to do it himself if he had the power.

     However, to limit such potential abuse of power, these appointed chiefs had to be held with a tight leash, which is why the Commissioner rejected the recommendation by the D.O, Kumba and the Resident, Buea to exile Mukete's detractors. It is not entirely unlikely that Mukete himself might have broached this solution or at least hinted at it in discussions with the D.O. If so, it reminds one of the proverbial tails attempting to wag the dog

     Be it as it may, all of these points to one thing: Bawe may in fact be right in his claim that Mukete's are the "indisputable owners of the Bafaw paramountcy stool" but this is so only if he is referring to the "stool" fabricated and imposed by the British colonial authorities and to which they appointed Mukete in 1929 after only the most perfunctory "consultation" of the people. But if he and others are referring to the traditional stool, the one inherited by Ebakudibo from Midiki, that is another matter entirely.

     Considering the latter, despite Bawe's pontification, there are many questions to be asked, but only six of them are immediately relevant. But before doing so, it is necessary to emphasize two important factors. First, Bafo are a patrilineal people" they inherit their status, rights and obligations fro, their fathers. Second, the founder and first chief of Kumba was Midiki mi Wukeng or Midiki I of Bashibi sub-lineage of Bapeban lineage.

     According to one version of the Bafo oral Tradition, Midiki I was succeeded as chief by Midiki II and Midiki III, followed by Wbakudibo, Nguti Malong and Ndinkung. It should be noted, however, that Ebakudibo, Wukussa and Ndikung were of the Ban ba- Mbai sub-Lineage of Bapeban, and that Nguti Malong was of the Enong sub-lineage of Bapeban. Thus, whatever may have been the succession between Midiki, Ebakudibo and Nguti Malong that is between Bashibi, Ban ba-Mbai and Enong, the ultimate factor which determined the right of each of these men to the chieftaincy was their kinship ties? They were all Bapeban.

     This brings us to the first six questions that need to be addressed: Aside from being Ebakudibo's son- in law, was Abel Mukete related to any of the persons mentioned above? How? This is important because even Mulango, despite this disputed ancestry was, if nothing else, a "son" of Ebakudibo by assimilation and the last tenuous link with the chieftaincy which originated with Midiki I. Is this perhaps why Dundas seemed so anxious to discredit him? We can only speculate.

     Second, how, when, and why did the chieftaincy which originated with Midiki and the Bishibi sub- lineage of the Bapeban lineage change hands to Ebakudibo and the Ban ba-Mbai sub-lineage of Bapeban? Third, why if anything, were the understandings that preceded or guaranteed the legitimacy of the transfer? Fourth, what if anything, were the rituals of kingship that formalized the transfer? Fifth, why is Ebakudibo mentioned by Dundas only in connection with the thinly-disguised effort to prove that Mulango was not his son and why does he, Dundas, identify Ebakudibo only as an "influential and wealthy man" and not as a chief? Six, was this a mere oversight or was it a deliberate attempt to denigrate the tradition he represented so that Abel Nkembone Mukete, "the great cocoa farmer" and "progressive" , should appear a more desirable and compelling candidate for the paramount chieftaincy?

     These questions, especially the last four, must be confronted even though they may lead to awkward and inconvenient truths. It seems safe to say that the transfer was not a private transaction between Midiki and Ebakudibo. This would tend to suggest that the chieftaincy was a trivial and inconsequential institution indeed. But it was not. It was a state of affairs of the utmost significance, moreover, as any student of African History knows, kinship is the organizing principle of African Society and the Bafo are no exception to this rule. Kinship as indicated earlier, determines the status, rights and obligations of all citizens, including chiefs. It would have been unusual indeed if it did not pay play a role in the transfer of the chieftaincy from Midiki to Ebakudibo, the maternal grandfather of Nfon Mukete. Furthermore, as it is widely known African Kingship, however humble its origins and territorial jurisdiction, is always sanctioned by elaborate ritual based in tradition. The mere fact that it has been thought necessary to publicly enlist the Bashibi sub-lineage and the Kumba "Kingmakers" in support of Mukete dynastic claims more than suggests the tradition, however diminished or distorted it may be, is still too potent a factor to be entirely ignored. Nor can its keepers. Bawe is brave indeed. He rushes in heedlessly, where wise men tread softly. But one gets the impression that he is a hired pen engaged in the cynical manipulation of public opinion to promote a thinly-veiled agenda. If so, he does a great disservice to his employers who, one suspects, deliberately put him up to a task for which his lack of knowledge and slender skills do not suit him. This disservice extends to the Bafo, a small, gifted and generous but embattled people who have long been traduced, in part because of their own glaring mistakes. But however grave their mistakes may be, they deserve better and should not also have their history travestied by the dabbling of uninformed amateurs and dilettante. This, Shakespeare would surely have agreed is "the unkindest cut of all".

     Bawe's sweeping declarations about the Kumba chieftaincy stem from a fundamental error: his uncritical reliance on the Dundas report which he mistakes for history. But history cannot be based on the paltry and patchy evidence of a single document used uncritically. As any competent undergraduate will confirm, the report is not history. Nor was it intended to be. At best it provides some useful data for the writing of history. Otherwise, like all the intelligence, Assessment and Reassessment Reports, it was intended for the use of hard-pressed colonial officials, especially administrators which knew nothing about Cameroon people, cultures and societies. As is well known, these administrators came to Africa with a heavy freight of distortions that needed correction.

     Moreover, the conditions they found were still unsettled due to the Anglo- French campaign in the country during World War I.

     The Dundas report was supposed to help correct this ignorance and the resulting distortions. Particularly, it was supposed to provide them information on which to "asses" the tax to be imposed on the people. To use it as history and try to make it serve a purpose for which it was not intended is to wholly misunderstand its value. With regard to the chieftaincy of Kumba, Bawe's reliance upon the report does not clarify the issues, it obscures or ignores them.

     And whatever may be the merits of the claims which he and others base on the report, it should be emphasised that there are counterclaims made elsewhere, including unwritten sources, they should be cross checked. Only then can we come closer to the truth. Until then, the last word has not been said about this matter and far from being over, the discussions is only just beginning. For the controversy, now eighty-one years old, is bound to grow more intense if only because since independence the Cameroon government has adopted a distinctly more interventionist policy that has not only politicized the institution of chieftaincy but rather eroded its traditional basis. On the other hand, because the incumbent of the house of Mukete is nearing the end of his rule, this adds a new dimension to the intensity-and urgency- of the discussion. Ultimately, perhaps inevitably, this will almost certainly become pretexts for even government intervention in the interest of national policy as British authorities did in 1929 to strengthen colonial rule. In the colonial situation the chieftaincy was the hostage of the government policy. It seems destined to be so now and in the foreseeable future, Dundas or no Dundas.

*Lovett Z. Elango is Retired Professor of History, Emeritus.

The Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC and its Problems: What must be done to fix these Problems



Nanje School of Creative Thinking has turned its focus this time around to reveal the findings of its investigations. At issue, is the way the Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC conducts its daily business with its clients.

                                                By Jackson W. Nanje

Over the years, Cameroonians residing in the United States have always complained about the poor treatment they get from their embassy in Washington DC, which is a place they ought to call home. Rather, it has been a place where hostile treatment has been the hallmark to have necessitated this investigation. Also, it is the opinion of most Cameroonians that the Cameroon Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency, Joseph Foe-Atangana, just like his predecessors, has not been able to adequately address the frustrations of Cameroonians. It is also the conclusion of our investigations that the reason some of these problems have not been solved is partly due to the selection process of our ambassadors (described below) by the President of Republic, who does the selection strictly on tribal grounds rather than on meritorious considerations. The present ambassador may be a good man as some have testified; however, his inability to address the numerous problems that Cameroonians are confronted with tends to give credence to our conclusive investigative report---which hinges around the poor selection process of these ambassadors. These ambassadors lack the necessary fundamentals in conflict resolution to be able to address these problems which have kept stirring at them like a deer in a fog light immediately after Cameroon established diplomatic relations with the United States. Indeed, because all of our ambassadors, including Foe-Atangana, have never been tested in the field of real diplomacy, and because they were hand-picked without any form of scrutiny by Members of Parliament, they therefore lack the ability to understand the complexities that come with the responsibilities as a Cameroon Ambassador to the United States. This is even more complicated because, if all of them, beginning from Ambassador Paul Pundi to Jerome Mendounga and now to Joseph Foe-Atangana had been previously tested through the ascendency process prior to coming to the United States, they would possess some form of creative imagination in disentangling the web of problems at the embassy that Cameroonians have constantly complained of. All three ambassadors lack sophistry in dealing with the problems; and their inability resonate from the selection process. It is also our understanding that visa requests and passport renewals and issuance are the two sought-after services of most Cameroonian-Americans. Why the embassy cannot accommodate these basic needs, is beyond comprehension.

Our investigations further reveal that Ambassador Foe-Atangana merits a C-plus in his job approval ratings due to the fact that he has been able to address some of the problems better than his predecessors. Some will even attest to the fact that the ambassador has made it a pledge that anyone who is unable to get good service from any of his embassy staffer should contact him via his direct line with their problems. Indeed, it is the testimony of a few whom the ambassador has intervened on their behalf that, he has in fact, resolved some of their problems at the embassy. But is that what is expected of an ambassador, who is suppose to imbibe in each of his staff the call of duty, to rise to the demands and responsibilities of public service without choosing who, which, and whose problems to solve? This, in no small way calls on the President of the country to revisit the selection process of his ambassadors. He needs to appoint them while the parliament confirms them.

The issue we are confronted with isn’t whether the ambassador is a good man or whether a few of his staffers who have chosen to ply their career in the public service are good civil servants; we are expecting the embassy servants, under the guidance of the ambassador, whom we expect to possess the necessary skills and credentials, to tackle these problems and also for them to perform beyond the call of duty in the delivery of services to their clients, regardless.

When we take an ephemeral glance, for instance, at the estimated annual revenue raised by the Embassy officials from visa applications and other services it renders to clients alone, it is unimaginable, unpardonable and unconscionable why a portion of that huge revenue it raises annually cannot be ploughed back into addressing these age-old problems. The embassy can self-finance its activities based on the vast revenue it generates. The embassy processes approximately five hundred (500) visa applications weekly with exceptions to the months of November and December, whereby the weekly numbers double to about a thousand (1000) visa applications. In a year, the embassy processes approximately twenty-eight thousand (28,000) visas at one hundred and forty-one ($141.00) dollars each. The revenue raised from visa applicants alone is $3,948.000.00 (1,974,000,000FCFA). This is approximately 2billion FCFA raised in the United States alone. And this sum is expected to increase each year because the numbers of Cameroonians who apply to become US Citizens increase yearly and very few Cameroonians retire finally to Cameroon to realize a downward shift in revenue. This is stunning revenue that the embassy (Cameroon government) makes from visa applicants (mostly Cameroonians) compared to the documented (lousy) services that they provide to Cameroonians in return. From this revenue alone, one can clearly discern why the request for dual citizenship, which would erase this vast revenue from the government’s coffers and equally ease the problems of Cameroonians, is a far cry, and at best, a futile effort by some Diaspora groups even as the government fails to see the amount of remittances this same individuals transmit via money transport agencies and what they carry along with them during their annual pilgrimage to Cameroon. However, this is a topic for another day.

Which are these problems that Cameroonians have been so eager for (the ambassadors) or the government of Cameroon to fix? The problems are the following: (a) poor customer service; (b) high visa fees compared to those of other countries similarly placed; (c) delay in processing passports and the need to decentralize consular services; (d) selection process of ambassadors to the US; (e) poorly constructed website.

                                             (a) Poor Customer Service

“The amount of money Cameroonians pay to process their visas and passports compared to the quality of service they get from their embassy in return, is, indeed, pathetic and pitiful” Anonymous.

“We can have an irate customer who is very wrong; but good business practice requires that you, the provider of the product or service, not argue with the customer. You appease the customer. Let the customer go home happy even if he or she is wrong. That is the overarching goal.” (SAF, Camnetwork)

The above statements were made by two trained Customer Service personalities from Cameroon, residing in the United States, who see customer service completely differently from the way the embassy personnel (who are always confrontational and rude), see it. Their statements above are the prototype examples of what is expected of our embassy staffers as opposed to that (rudeness) which we currently endure from them.

You will be lucky to get a staff of the Cameroon Embassy on the phone with good scruples, to empathize with you and address your problem in any way or form expected of anyone who serves, and who is being paid by the same tax payers they abuse incessantly. Why do they despise the Cameroonian people who pay their salary so much? The staffs hardly answer the Embassy phones. I wonder, to begin with, why there are phonelines at embassy in the first place which they hardly answer! And if and when they decide to answer the phones, you will even regret why you ever stayed on that phone to listen to their unpleasant service. Rude? Yes. Unpleasant? Absolutely. Are the staffs a disgrace to the image of the country or a reflection of the poor customer service Cameroonians have become synonymous to? Unquestionable.  The staffs are a product of bad selection process and of a poor or insufficient training given them by the Cameroon government. In other African Embassies, for instance the Nigerian Embassy, trained customer service personnel address the concerns of every caller with respect and due diligence. They do transfer callers to the appropriate authorities and if one leaves a voice mail, the customer representative will ensure that a response to your request or inquiry is communicated to you somehow. Sometimes they go the extra mile to ask you if you were satisfied with the services you received at their embassy. However, this is not the case with the Cameroon Embassy. The ambassador must address this problem and others because, Cameroonians are very unhappy with the poor services they get from his leadership and management of the embassy, which ought to be a safe-haven for them.

Why is Mr. Gervais Bindzi, who is in-charge of passport renewal and issuance as well as visa services, doing this heavy-lifting alone at the embassy? Cameroonians believe that because he is overwhelmed with his workload, and has not been given adequate back up cover by the ambassador, is one of the reasons for the unacceptable delays and poor customer service that has been substituted for courteous, pleasant and swift services? In Cameroon, for instance, the department of Special branch of the Police department is charged with the issuance of new passports and visa processing. Why the ambassador took away this service from the Commissioner at the embassy needs further clarifications.

                                                 (b) High visa fees

In order to justify the high cost of Cameroon’s visa fees, Nanje School of Creative Thinking did a comparative analysis of six countries in Africa, which have embassies in the United States, of the cost of their visas vis-à-vis that of Cameroon. The countries on the survey are South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Equatorial Guinea. It is important to know that if a country like the United States raises the cost of her travel visa it is usually tied not only on budget constraints but also to the interest-benefit (or utility) to be gotten by applicants once they arrive in the United States; but the high cost of visa by the Cameroon government (which ought to encourage migration into the country), defies the interest-benefit logic.

The chart below shows what other countries in Africa charge for a travel visa. We selected countries in Central Africa, which is in the same zone as Cameroon, and also, from West Africa and South of Africa as well. If one compares the cost-benefit-interest analyses of South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana to those of Cameroon, there is absolutely no justification for the imposition of the high cost of the Cameroon’s visa. Also, in countries like Gabon that charges $141.00 as Cameroon, the visa demands for multiple entries whereas that of Cameroon is only for a three (3) months stay. Ghana, whose visa is for three (3) months stay comparatively to what the Cameroon government charges, her visa cost is only $60.00 compared to the $141.00 of Cameroon. See the chart for more comparative analysis.

S. Africa Cameroon Gabon Nigeria Ghana Sierra Leone Equatorial Guinea

$72.00 $141.00 $141.00 Varies but less than Cameroon $60.00 &$100.00 £75.00/

£100.00

No fees

Valid for 3months Valid for 3months Valid for 1825days Multiple entry 3months &Multiple 6 months

Multiple entry Visa not required

Obviously, there should be more explanations which the government of Cameroon may provide to justify the high cost of their travel visa fees to visitors different from those of countries similarly placed than meet the eyes. Whatever explanations the government may give for the high cost of its visa fee eludes the cost-benefit-interest analyses. Therefore, the call for a reduction of the fee or the extension in the entry period (multiple) into the country is absolutely needed. The government cannot postpone this issue anymore. They must be addressed now.

                       (c) Delays in Passport Issuance & a need to Decentralize Consular Offices

Presently, the Cameroon embassy, like those of other nations in the United States, is situated in the capital city of Washington DC. It caters for the needs of Cameroonians and non-Cameroonians in United States, Mexico, Virgin Islands, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and the United Nations Diplomats. Most African nations have had exponential growth in their population in the United States over the years as a result of migration from their native countries. And as a result of the increase in their population they have expanded their consular services in strategic population belts as well. Cameroon population in the US has experienced similar increase; however, in spite of the growth in population, Cameroonians have relentlessly demanded of their government to expand consular services in states closer to them, to ease the congestion at the embassy and to reduce the delays in services. From ambassador to ambassador, promises have been made but none have been kept by all these ambassadors. In fact, they have taken Cameroonians for fools.

If one should indeed examine the annual revenue (2billion FCFA) earnings of the embassy, with Cameroonians as the primary source of the revenue, it is apparent that, at least two other consular installations in addition to the embassy in Washington DC could be built in the US, and another in the Virgin Islands. But these demands have fallen on dearth ears. Cameroonians have expressed their displeasures for the lack of action through various cultural groups and other ancillary organizations beginning with Ambassadors Paul Pondi (in the 80’s), to Jerome Mendounga (in the 90’s) and now to Joseph Foe-Atangana, for them to inform the Cameroon government of the need to honor their repeated request, to decentralize consular services within the US.

The Nigerian government for instance, has its embassy in Washington DC but it also has consular offices in Atlanta, Los Angeles and in New York. The Cameroon operates an embassy in Abuja, Lagos and in Calabar, where Cameroon’s present ambassador to the US, Foe-Atangana came from. Also, the Ivory Coast government has, in addition to their embassy in Washington DC, a consular office in Los Angeles. The list is endless. We are however hopeful that the government will undo its wrongdoings and for a change, “listen” to the people in 2013.

Since 2008, the government of Cameroon stopped using the Cameroon passport and in its place, adopted the Central African Regional passport that bears the acronym-CEMAC. Cameroonians with the old passports were given substantial time to change from their Cameroon-issued passports to the CEMAC regional passports. In Cameroon it is easy to change or be issued a new passport once all requirements are fulfilled. However, in the United States, as it is with other Cameroonian embassies abroad, there are some bottlenecks involved that has necessitated this report. The Cameroon Embassy in Washington DC serves the following countries: the vast country of the United States, Mexico, and Jamaica, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and United Nations diplomats. Also, Cameroonians who reside in countries out of the United States must make travel arrangements, usually costly, to come to the United States (which is the only passport renewal/issuance authorized center in the region), in order to get a new passport.

The reason why those making new passports must travel to the embassy in Washington DC is because the new passports are required to be biometric, that is, passport applicants must appear in person to provide their fingerprints to be inscribed on the passports. The government ought to have sub-contracted the fingerprint to local Police departments (and have the materials mailed to that police department at cost to the applicant) wherever the applicant finds himself/herself, to prevent the displacement of the applicant, which comes with huge travel cost. In every country of the world today, the Police departments handle the fingerprinting of any sort; and why the Cameroon government cannot outsource the fingerprinting at cost to her clients, stretches my imagination.Also, besides the Police department, there are some UPS outfits that the embassy can contract with to provide this biometric prints, which will be sent to Cameroon immediately or to the embassy. Making Cameroonians to travel from afar just for fingerprints speaks of a country yet to embrace technological advancement, and, that has to change. The US government trusts in outfits as the UPS, to give them the contract to process fingerprints for its clients; I therefore see no reason why our government (embassy), should not. 

Another disheartening aspect in this passport snag is the amount of time it takes for applicants to receive their passports once the renewal process has been completed. The passports are not processed at the embassy in Washington DC; they are transported to Cameroon by an embassy staff or a reliable individual who happens to be traveling to Cameroon and they are equally brought back by another reliable source when one is found in Cameroon who is coming back to the United States. Why the embassy has not contracted one of these several courier services like UPS, FEDEX, or DHL, all of which have a base in Cameroon (even at cost to the passport applicant), defies every theory of system of organization. So, applicants who need to make their urgent business trips for instance must wait (for approximately 3 months) until when the embassy can find their so-called reliable source to take and bring back their passports before they may travel. This is indeed, despicable. For the money we pay for services at the embassy, they ought to be expedient with the services they provide to their customers because, such delays, are, indeed, unnecessary.

In order for the embassy to reduce the wait time necessary to process these passports, and increase the positive feedbacks from her clients, she must contract the services of either UPS or FEDEX or DHL. Once one of these agencies is contracted, it will reduce the uncertainty that goes with the so-called reliable passport handlers.

                         (d) The selection process of ambassadors to serve in the US

We, at the Nanje School of Creative Thinking understand that to include the critic of the ambassadorial selection process may robe some officials of the government the wrong way; perhaps this may be a start for others to start subjecting some of the government’s erratic policies to some degree of scrutiny. It is the belief of most Cameroonians, as our investigations gathered, that, the reason why the services at the embassy have been so compromising is partially due to the fact that the selection process of most of our ambassadors, especially those posted to the United States of America, have been wanting. Cameroon as a country has over 270 ethnic groupings; however, the two Presidents who have "ruled" Cameroon believe(d) that the most competent of ambassadors to be posted to the United States of America must only come from the Beti ethnic enclave. Disastrous policy that speaks more of tribalism and nepotism than of competence. This must and should change. Merit should be the only consideration if Cameroon must stand out as an emerging nation.The fact that none of the ambassadors posted to the United States were tested before their diplomatic assignments to complex diplomatic terrain, where superior diplomatic skills shouldn’t be in short supply, is one of the root causes of the contempt. Take for example in America, before one is thrown in the hot zones of diplomacy, such an individual must have served in lesser challenging countries to areas of challenging diplomacy before been posted to the highly compartmentalized diplomatic zones. I know some feeble-minded opinionated thinkers would compel us not to compare Cameroon (a developing economy) which has being in existence for only 50 plus years to America (an advanced economy), which has lasted for more than 200years. This is a fatal attempt at legitimizing mediocrity over a better system of social organization, which many African scholars have agreed is attainable in Africa. It is possible to learn from other countries and start implementing their refined ways than to be stagnated in decedence by making room for corrupt individuals who bleed the country dry while the convince others to be patient with the system that things will take their natural course.

Alternatively, maybe it is about time that the Cameroon government began reviewing the inadequacies of the School of International Relations (IRIC) that trains these ambassadors. There are Cameroonians who studied in schools outside IRIC and out of Cameroon, who could complement the diplomatic core as they make their passage through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into future ambassadors. This unnecessary over-reliance on IRIC, is a disastrous policy that the government must consider making a paradigm shift. Countries like Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ivory Coast, who are far advanced in diplomacy and democratic values than Cameroon, often tap members of its diplomatic core from universities abroad. Professors of Public administration, history and political sciences make good members of the diplomatic core and our government must start looking into those areas for selection of diplomats. After all, they are teachers of diplomacy.

For over thirty years that President Paul Biya has been in power, he has appointed two ambassadors to the United States: ambassadors Jerome Mendounga and Joseph Foe-Atangana, without the confirmation of the Cameroon House of Parliament. Mendounga was a product of DR Congo (formerly Zaire) and Foe-Atangana came from a consular office in Calabar, Nigeria. We cannot over-emphasize the inadequacies in the selection process or the experiences these two men had prior to their appointments to the highest diplomatic service center in the world; but nonetheless, the conclusion we came to, is that, the poor services Cameroonians encounter at the embassy may be a direct reflection of the poor selection process. No one but President Paul Biya knows what matrix is used in the selection of our ambassadors. We expect those who have excelled in tested areas like Italy, France, Canada, Britain, Germany, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, to merit the honor to be confirmed in our House of Assembly before they are sent to serve in the United States, the heartbeat of democracy and diplomacy. Ambassadors from those small states, especially those from most African countries, who have not evolved through this natural ascendency process, do not honestly qualify to serve as ambassadors in the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy and Russia, no matter how hard the regime in Yaoundé tries to doctor or impress upon us with their scanty credentials.

Also, ambassadors are supposed to be career diplomats who have served in different countries for at least two years, and at most, three years and be transferred immediately after to another country where they are expected to stay same. But this is not the case with ambassadors from Cameroon. Our ambassadors spend on average, ten (10) years or more in posted countries before they are transferred. For instance, in the US, Cameroon as a nation has had just three (3) ambassadors since 1960 (52 years). These ambassadors with unnecessary long tenures see themselves as untouchables and therefore, the peoples’ problems and concerns do not mean anything to them. In fact, these untouchables do not see any urgency in addressing the problems of Cameroonians who contribute billions every year to the national budget. And since these ambassadors are answerable to their master (the President) rather than to the tax payers (the people), the problems shall continue to stir at us.

                                  (e) A Poorly constructed Website

The gateway into every country is through the airport. And, taxi drivers give the first and last impression to visitors that come into any city. Similarly, a hotel doorman, who welcomes the guests on arrival and departure, gives the first and last impression to all guests. All these hold same in our Cameroon embassy in Washington DC, where the first individual clients meet or talk to on the phone is the receptionist, who does not give Cameroonians a pleasant impression. Again, the story of the receptionist at the embassy is one which will be told some other day. The above indicators tell us all about an establishment. Nowadays, many people use the internet as a tool to do business with any organization and/or establishment. You take the American Embassy in Cameroon for an example, you can go online and schedule a visa appointment and that appointment date shall be honored once you arrive at the embassy.

In today’s world, computers have practically replaced lots of the work previously done by humans. It has also transformed the world and made tasks very easy to accomplish. Many have seized the opportunities that technology has to offer but the Cameroon embassy is yet to get a handle of technology because some of the duties that computers perform are still being performed by the embassy staff. Quite rudimentary! The Cameroon embassy’s website (www.cameroonembassyusa.org ) is one of the worst in the world. Even the websites of some tribes like the Oroko (www.orokousa.org ), Manyu (www.mecca-usa.org ) and the Bakossi (www.bacda.org ), Bali (www.bca.org ), or my village, Dikome Balue (www.dideco.org), have better websites than that of the embassy. In most websites today, one can practically pay for everything through the internet and place them in a cart. When these menu bars are made available at the embassy website, the embassy will be left with very little to do. Such a website is called an interactive one, whereby the customer pays for all his services like visa application, passport size photographs, fiscal stamps and notary online without going from place to place to get these documents assembled. There is absolutely no reason why the high visa fee required of Cameroonians cannot be paid directly into the embassy’s account from the comfort of our homes like other embassies do.

The presentation of the website is very unpleasant to its clients. Why the embassy cannot hire the services of its countrymen, who are capable of lifting the image of the country by constructing a state-of-the-art website, troubles my aching heart. And most of us are aware of how much it costs to build a website. Why the government cannot cover some of its frailties by changing the gateway (website) into the country, and with all the revenue the embassy generates from visa and passports, it is, indeed, pitiful.

                                                              Conclusion

In conclusion, we found the need to document these problems (which have existed shortly after Cameroon established diplomatic relations with the US) not because we want to bring the embassy to submission, but because of the need to draw the embassy’s attention to the grey areas where it has failed to bring about effective, meaningful, and transformational changes. Mindful of the criticisms lingering around the embassy, the ambassador may be in the position now, hopefully, to search for alternative solutions to address these problems. We are hopeful that our investigative and critical analysis shall enable the Cameroon government, through its ambassador, to who vested powers is given, to start making transformational changes at the embassy in order to win the trust of Cameroonians. Some of such changes should include: (a) sponsorship of many field trips to enable the embassy personnel to interact with Cameroonians during their annual conventions; (b) have cultural representatives or a goodwill ambassadors as liaison officers to the embassy who shall provide updates to their respective communities; (c) Sponsorship of programs to familiarize the embassy staffers to new approach in governance (d) installation of consular services nearer areas in close proximity to Cameroonians (e) employing Cameroonians within the United States who possess the necessary expertise and better customer service skills to positions at the embassy and in the new consular offices. (f) Employ Cameroonian interns (students of Political sciences, hospitality, Public Administration, Liberal Arts) to intern in various departments at the embassy all year round. All these programs are geared towards establishing good and effective Embassy-Cameroonian community relations so that Cameroonians can pride themselves to call the embassy home, at long last.

Platitudes aside, whether the government of Cameroon assigns incompetent personnel to the Cameroon embassy in the United States or not, is really not the issue; the issue is, each of these ambassadors ought to have used the powers decreed to them and the enormous resources at their disposal, to transform the place into an institutional paradise. It is the ambassador’s responsibility to bring necessary reforms that would transform and uplift the image of the embassy. Cameroonians are tired to see that ambassadors who are sent here only come to loot rather than transform the place, and later abandon the place worse off than they met it. And the fact that the Biya regime keeps each of these ambassadors here for more than ten (10) years is also an issue of grave concern. In order for the embassy to evolve from the present state of decrepitude the government must start rotating Cameroon ambassadors and diplomatic staff members for at least every two (2) years, and at most, three (3) years. No embassy person is expected to stay in any one embassy installations for as many years as the Cameroon government keeps theirs. The fact that they stay for so long in one country is the root cause of corruption and the “I don’t care attitude” they often demonstrate to clients rather than they need to serve them.

VINCENT FEKO [and Albert Mukong]: One Unsung Hero in the Struggle for Multipatyism in Camerooon



This is excerpted from Professor Emmanuel Konde's forthcoming monograph titled Political Transition in Cameroon: From Ahidjo's Old Order, Biya's New Deal, to Fru Ndi's Multipartyism? Vincent Feko and Albert Mukong were political allies in the struggle for multipartyism in Cameroon.  No narrative of the work of Feko in this regard would be complete without mention of Mukong.

                                                  By Emmanuel Konde, 2013

      Vincent Feko and Albert Mukong were friends for 34 years and he, above all else, probably knew Mukong best. His revelations about Mukong’s struggles to create the Social Democratic Front (SDF) have not only debunked the testimonies hitherto presented by others but also shed some light on how that political party was founded. At the time of his meeting with Mukong in 1989, Feko was a contract worker with the Customs Service at the Douala Port. Vincent Feko, a rare political figure who never sought the limelight, was a graduate of Sasse College and studied economics at Cuttington College in Liberia on a USAID scholarship.

                                                           Toward a Multiparty System

     Two major political forces altered the face of Cameroon politics in the 1990s. One emerged from English-speaking Cameroon and the other from French-speaking Cameroon. Neither of these forces could have succeeded without the assistance of the other. Although these forces failed to converge into a combustible political mixture, each nonetheless, influenced the transition of Cameroon from a one-party to a multiparty system. The catalyst for multiparty politics in Cameroon, as Dibussi Tande accurately posited was the Yondo Black Affair that suddenly erupted like a whirlwind in Francophone Cameroon. What has been in dispute for some time, however, is the originator of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) whose roots are deeply embedded in Anglophone Cameroon.

     Of the founding fathers of the SDF we know. That these founding fathers can be reduced to just one founder is a question whose answer I do not propose to offer. What I propose to offer here is a partial catalog of the men whose efforts made the SDF possible. That a group of individuals had met on November 11, 1989 in the Bamenda Presbyterian Church Center to organize the SDF is not in dispute. That the members of this group, including Justice Nyo Wakai, Clement Ngwasiri, Siga Assagna, John Fru Ndi, and Albert Mukong can be called “founding father” is neither at issue here. At issue is who originated the idea. Below are three versions of varying lengths that purport to illuminate the question of originator. The three names often mentioned are Ndeh Ntumazah, Albert Mukong, and John Fru Ndi. From my reading of what transpired, however, I came to the conclusion that the three men were somehow linked to one another. Whether this controversy is a matter of mere semantics or actual substance is not made any clearer here; but it goes deep into explaining some of the insignificant issues that can bog down a sublime political endeavor.

      Ndeh Ntumazah, the last of the original UPC leaders (see Chapter 2: The Turning Point) is on record as saying that he was the originator of the SDF. Ntumazah is noted to have asserted that: “I say this without feeling that I have betrayed Fru Ndi, that the SDF was my brainchild….” Although Barrister Luke Sendze, a principal player in the founding of the SDF and contributor of case documents for the publication of Ntumazah’s autobiography dismisses this assertion, he admits of a declaration Ntumazah made to him one evening:

     "I told Fru Ndi that he would be a great hero for this country fighting the French than trying to outwit them. I told him that so long as the French are in control… he has no chance of becoming president of this country. It is the French who decide who governs this Cameroon, not the ballot box. Until you chase away the French, no amount of protest will change anything."

     A more detailed account comes from Vincent Feko, who accompanied the late Albert Mukong to two meetings they held with their Francophone counterparts in Douala in December 1989 and January 1990. These meetings would result in their being arrested by the Cameroon authorities and also the demise of the one-party system in Cameroon. What follow is Feko’s recollection of those meetings, which I have documented at the end.

     Vincent Feko recollects that “the idea to create this political party was brought up by Albert Mukong, and it was him who after his release from prison took the initiative to contact us individually to join him to create the party. I am talking about the real founding fathers of the SDF.” The main objective of the SDF at its conception was to work for a return to the two-state federation. Thus, it became necessary to identify some serious French-speaking Cameroonians to join in this mission. Again, it was Mukong who initiated the search for Francophones. The Francophone whom Mukong first contacted was Professor Jean Michel Tekam, who was based in Paris. Given the fact that Professor Tekam was abroad and thus felt that he could not contribute effectively to the project at hand from long distance, he directed Mukong to make contact with a friend of his in Douala named Yondo Black.

                                                            Vincent Feko, 1937-2013

     In December 1989 Albert Mukong went to Douala to meet with Yondo Black. Vincent Feko attended the meeting at which Mukong briefed Yondo Black on the project he was working on. His goal was to persuade the latter to join him in founding a new political party. According to Feko, at the end of Mukong’s presentation Yondo Black paused for a moment to reflect on what Mukong had divulged. Then, “embarrassingly, [Yondo Black] turned around and tried to sell us the same commodity which we had proposed to him a moment earlier.” Yondo Black told Mukong and Feko that he was heading a group that was working on a similar project as theirs and called on Mukong and Feko to join them.

     Two Cameroonians, it seems, had been thinking about and working toward forming a political party at about the same time. Both, it seems again, had been responding to what they perceived as oppressive political conditions that prevailed in their country under the monolithic single party system. From all apparent indications Albert Mukong and Yondo Black were searching for ways to alleviate the political domination of the CPDM and to open up Cameroon to political pluralism. This development was a good thing. It reflected something positive about the political future of Cameroon. But the suspicion that has divided Anglophones and Francophones since the unilateral transformation of the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon in 1985 by President Paul Biya seems to have intruded itself deep into the noble cause espoused by Yondo Black and Albert Mukong. This suspicion, which was clearly manifested in Vincent Feko’s analysis of what was happening before his very own eyes, no doubt contributed to preventing the coalescing of two potentially formidable democratic forces to symbiosis. Rather than seize that auspicious moment to bring the democratic Anglophone and Francophone forces together, Feko instead smelled a rat and allowed his distrust of Francophones to overwhelm his judgment. As Feko himself tells it, he felt that Yondo Black was being dishonest. Feko reasoned that had Yondo been working on such a project his close friend, Professor Tekam, would definitely have not only been privy to it but would most likely have hinted Mukong. A great opportunity for crafting a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship linking Francophone and Anglophone political operatives was thus squandered.

     Mukong and Feko left Yondo Black. On their way out, Feko, who admits of being bitter and disappointed by Yondo Black’s performance, told Mukong that they should not go to Yondo again and suggested that they should seek some other Francophone collaborators but not Yondo Black, Vincent Feko was obviously convinced that Yondo Black had just learned of the idea about floating a political party from them and was trying to pull a fast one. This narrative by Vincent Feko was revealed during an interview with a local newspaper in 2006, more than 16 years since the 1989 meeting with Yondo Black, and nearly five years after the death of Albert Mukong.

     Despite the disappointing first meeting, Mukong, who had an uncanny instinct for political action, and Feko, met again with Yondo Black on January 23, 1990. This was a chance meeting, since the circumstances that led to the second meeting were accidental. Albert Mukong had learned that Professor Jean Michel Tekam was visiting Cameroon and that the latter was lodging at Hotel Beausejour in Akwa, Douala. He left Bamenda for Douala to meet with Tekam. Upon arriving Douala, Vincent Feko accompanied Mukong to Hotel Beausejour where they were supposed to meet Professor Tekam. Unfortunately, the professor was absent when the two men arrived. They were told that Tekam was out. It would appear that the planning of this meeting was executed haphazardly, perhaps to circumvent the security police from tracing Mukong’s movements. Otherwise, it is not clear why Mukong and Feko to have had a rendezvous with Tekam only to be disappointed by his absence.

     After waiting for sometime and Tekam did not show up, Mukong suggested that they should visit Yondo Black, whose residence was not far away from Hotel Beausejour. The pair drove to Yondo Black’s place. Soon after they entered Yondo Black’s home, Professor Tekam and Gabriel Hameni, the Principal of Lycée Jos in Douala, joined them. In all, there were about nine or ten people in the room where the group met. Excepting Mukong and Feko who were Anglophones, the other seven or eight there gathered were Francophones. Mukong and Feko once again tried to persuade them to join the Anglophone project of founding a political party; but the Francophones were adamant. Feko reported that he had “the impression that they saw the situation as one of rivalry between a Francophone and an Anglophone group. To them, it was a matter of seeing which group’s planning to float a political party would do it first.”

     Nevertheless, the group of Francophones and Anglophones discussed two important documents presented to them by Yondo Black, host and leader of the Francophone group (Yondo Black Group). The first of these documents was a sort of state of the nation address, the other a manifesto of the projected political party. Although the political party was not named, after discussing the two documents the group decided to merge them into one and have it translated into English.[3] Obviously, the Francophone Yondo Black Group was probably far advanced with its planning for lunching an opposition party against the hegemony of the ruling CPDM than the Anglophone Mukong Group. What is not clear is whether the idea of launching a political party was being developed at the same time by a Francophone (Yondo Black) and an Anglophone (Albert Mukong), or whether as Vincent Feko suggests, the idea was developed by the Mukong and stolen by Yondo Black. Timelines notwithstanding, the opposition forces suddenly coalesced and burst forth into the Cameroon political scene in the first half of 1990. Yet the inability of Francophone and Anglophone political operatives to form a united front at the propitious moment was symptomatic of the problems that have plagued Anglophone-Francophone relations in general and opposition collaboration in particular. The last contender for the position of founder of the SDF is John Fru Ndi, chairman of that party since its inception in 1990. A more detailed treatment of Fru Ndi is presented below, but a synoptic appraisal of the life of Albert Mukong would be apropos.

                                          Albert Womah Mukong, 1933-2004

     Albert Womah Mukong was the last of Cameroon’s authentic nationalists, all of whom never compromised principle for political expediency; none held political office or exercised political power. Many of these—Ruben Um Nyobe (1958), Felix Roland Moumie (1960), Ernest Ouandie (1971)—were assassinated by those whose hold on power they threatened. Only two lived to old age: Albert Mukong and Ndeh Ntumazah. Like Ntumazah, Mukong’s political life encompassed all the significant events of the nationalist and postcolonial phases of Cameroon’s political history. Unlike Ndeh Ntumazah who has held true to the original course for which he subscribed in the late 1940s, however, Albert Mukong vacillated from nationalist (One Kamerun - OK) to sectionalist (Social Democratic Front - SDF) to separatist (Southern Cameroons national Council – SCNC) and adhered to almost every political tendency in Cameroon. The one position from which Mukong never wavered was that of freedom for all Cameroonians. In a republic where rights and liberties were conspicuously in short supply, Mukong suffered enormously for his stance.

     Mukong belongs to a pantheon of Cameroonian political heroes. He was hewn from a special fabric, intricately interwoven in spirit with a select group of Cameroonians that included the likes of Ruben Um Nyobe, Felix Roland Moumié, Ernest Ouandie, and Abel Kingue. His struggle for political freedom spanned nearly half a century (1959-2004), and constituted the longest in Cameroon’s history in terms of consistency and adherence to principle. Like fellow nationalists who fell before him, Mukong’s was uncompromising to all forms of colonialism, where foreign or domestic. The man was not born a political revolutionary but the political forces of his times transformed him into one. Once convinced of his calling, Mukong never deviated from doing that which was right and proper for his people and country. He willingly gave of himself unselfishly to the good course and never wavered until his last breath on the morning of July 14, 2004.

     Born on October 23, 1933 at Bananki Tungo, Mukong received his primary education from St. Anthony’s Primary School in Njinikom, and his secondary education from St. Joseph’s College (Sasse) in Buea. A short stint as an employee of the Cameroon’s Development Corporation (CDC) was followed by studies for a degree in physics at the University of Ibadan in 1957. These were the momentous days of African resurgence after a century of slumbering under European colonialism. In Egypt Colonel Abdel Gamal Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal; in Kenya the Mau Mau was forcing the British to retreat from occupying the most arable of Kikuyu ancestral lands; in French Cameroon the UPC was demanding independence and immediate unification of both Cameroons, while in the English zone of the country Endeley, Foncha and other politicians were agitating for autonomy in British Southern Cameroons. These events captured the imagination of a physicist-to-be and forced him to abandon his professional dreams for the political realities of the moment.

     Mukong was a rare and exceptional Anglophone. Only Augustine Ngom Jua even comes close to an approximation of this man. Perhaps because of his long and varied political experiences—having had extensive contacts with the Upecistes Ernest Ouandie in prison in Cameroon, and Moumié, Ntumazah, and Abel Kingue in Accra, Ghana—Albert Mukong’s world view was a complex admixture of the radical nationalism of the UPC and the English rule of law that he learned in the British Southern Cameroons and Nigeria. These two traditions would become devastating weapons in his arsenal of organizational skills and protest activism.

     Caught in the political wave of the late 1950s, Mukong’s first endeavor as a political man was his work with KNDP’s “The Cameroon Voice”. In 1959 Mukong attended a Special Session of the United Nations that met from February 20 – March 13. Upon his return from the United Nations Mukong joined the One Kamerun party, the British Southern Cameroon’s branch of the nationalist UPC, founded by Ndeh Ntumazah in 1957. He first served as head of the student organ of the party and later as Secretary General of One Kamerun. It was in this capacity that Mukong participated in various constitutional conferences, including the July 1961 Foumban Conference. Mukong’s affiliation with One Kamerun placed him at loggerheads with the Ahidjo regime. This affiliation ultimately resulted in his exile to Accra, Ghana in 1962 by President Ahidjo. In Accra, Mukong joined Ndeh Ntumazah, Felix Moumié, Ernest Ouandie, and Abel Kingue.

                                                                 Albert Mukong

     Mukong left Accra in 1964, moved to Togo, and eventually returned to Cameroon in November 1966 following successful interventions of intermediaries through the Cameroon Ambassador in Nigeria. Four years later on Tuesday, October 6, 1970, at precisely five o’clock in the morning, members of Cameroon’s paramilitary Brigade Mixte Mobile (BMM) visited and arrested Mukong at his residence in Kumba. Mukong spent six years in various prisons and internment camps in the 1970s, during which he encountered other prisoners who opposed the Ahidjo regime, including Ernest Ouandie, alias camarade Emile. Ouandie would later be executed publicly in 1971 in front of his family and tribesmen by the authorities.

     When in 1988 Mukong aspired to severely criticize the New Deal government of President Biya for corruption, he was sent back to prison for nearly two years. Soon after his release from prison, Mukong was at it again discussing the prospects of launching a new political party. His reemerged once again on the national political stage in early 1990. This time he was arrested for consorting with the Yondo Black Group—Ekane Anicet, Charles Djon Djon, Kwa Moutomé, Yondo Black, Henriette Ekwe and others—for plotting to launch multipartism in Cameroon. For their participation in this constitutionally legal activity, Mukong and his collaborators were imprisoned by the authorities. Henriette Ekwe, the only female member of the group that met in Yondo Black’s residence on January 23, 1990 averred that when Mukong was brought in prison at BMM de Mboppi in Douala, he did not hesitate to tell prison commissioner Batchanji to “free all of them. I am solely responsible for the affair.”[4] Characteristic of the famous prisoner of Tcholliré, Mukong had refused to escape abroad when he learned of the arrest of his colleagues, despite the entreaties of Yondo Black sent to him through Vincent Feko. He would later explain his decision not to run away as stemming from the fact that “he could not reconcile such a decision with his conscience.”[5]

     Upon his release from prison in 1990, Mukong left the country on self exile and sought asylum in the United Kingdom. During his absence from the country a new Anglophone movement was organized under the leadership of Dr. Enonchong. Mukong returned to Cameroon in early 1992 and was met at the Douala airport by members of the newly formed Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), who guided him to the home of Dr. Enonchong in Douala and persuaded the warrior to enlist. According to Christmas Ebini, this is how Albert Mukong was brought into the Anglophone Movement and eventually made Secretary General during the organization’s extraordinary congress in Buea.[6]

     While in the United Kingdom where he had applied for asylum, Albert Mukong submitted his case against the Cameroon government to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on February 26, 1991. On July 21, 1994, the committee ruled in favor of Mukong. It found that Mukong had been subjected to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and that the Cameroon government had violated Article 19, the right to freedom of expression set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The committee further ruled that although the restrictions on Albert Mukong were provided for by Cameroonian law, they were not necessary to safeguard national security or public order. In 2001, seven years after the United Nations ruling of 1994, the Cameroon government compensated Mukong in the amount of $137,000 (72,000.000 cfa franc) for the abuses he had suffered at the hands of the authorities during several editions of imprisonment spanning almost two decades (See Appendix A).

     Mukong who had begun his career in politics as a one who sought a united country in which liberties would be extended equally to all citizens, ended up as a separatist when his every effort to make that dream become reality was frustrated by the regimes of Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961-1982) and Paul Biya (since 1982). By 1993 Mukong was convinced of the impossibility of democracy under the New Deal regime of President Biya. Attributing the stagnation to a difference in cultures, Mukong concluded:

     The Francophones have demonstrated that they are incapable of change. They have also effectively established that we are two separate peoples that cannot live together. Hey have established in fact that the union of two Cameroons is badly conceived and badly executed, full stop.

     Finally, Mukong joined the separatist Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) after the Cameroon government failed to satisfactorily address and redress the complaints of the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) I and II that met in Buea and Bamenda. The AAC had called for a return to the federal option concluded at Foumban in 1961.

     By the time of his death Mukong was perhaps the most influential English-Speaking Cameroonian in the country. When, for example, the SCNC entered a period of fractious leadership between Justice Fred Alobwede Ebong who was on exile in Nigeria and Dr. Martin Luma, Mukong lent his support to Dr. Luma. He justified his action by saying that: “I recognize only the faction of Dr. Martin Luma, which is involved with the field work. One cannot direct a country from the outside.” The traction that separatism garnered since the early 1990s was largely drawn from the stature of Albert Mukong. He stands alone as the only Cameroonian who played an active in the entire political spectrum of Cameroon. Mukong began as an advocate for the unification of the two Cameroons and ended as a separatist convinced of the unwillingness of the dominant Francophone leadership to negotiate a satisfactory political system with the marginalized Anglophone minority. He died a member of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) that was founded in 1995 to represent the sectional interests of Anglophone Cameroon, while advocating secession. Even so, as one of his young political collaborators who eulogized Mukong noted, “Mr. Mukong has fought his whole life and some periods of his fighting life are difficult to comprehend… it is certain that he never completely left the main objective of his OK party that had as its main objective ‘One Kamerun’ in a strong unification.”

***Professor Emmanuel Konde, a former Fulbright, teaches History and Political Science at Albany State University in Albany, Georgia.* For further inquiries on this write-up, you can reach the good professor via e-mail at ekonde07@yahoo.com***